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Natural Law, Equality, and Same-Sex
Marriage
PERRY DANE†
INTRODUCTION
In 1811, Sir William Scott, the distinguished English
judge later styled Lord Stowell, sitting in an English court
with civil matrimonial jurisdiction,1 heard the dispute
† Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Camden. I am grateful to participants
at the First Annual Law and Religion Roundtable held at the Brooklyn Law
School as well as a Faculty Workshop at Rutgers School of Law—Camden for their
probing and helpful questions about an earlier draft of this paper. I am also
grateful to participants at the Conference on “The Family: Searching for Fairest
Love” at the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture and to the student
members of the Liberal Party of the Yale Political Union—two very different
audiences—for their equally valuable reactions to earlier presentations of the
basic ideas in this paper and to colleagues at the New York University Law School
Institutes on the Park, especially Douglas Husak, who asked important questions
during my presentation on the overall project of which this paper is a part.
Finally, I am especially indebted to Jerry Vildostegui for his incisive and deeply
thoughtful comments on the paper and its various arguments and to Phillip Cary
for honing in on some crucial ambiguities in my argument.
1. The court was the Court of Consistory, an ecclesiastical tribunal. By 1811,
however, the Court of Consistory was an integral part of the English system of
justice. See R.B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL
COURTS, 1500-1860, at 1-4 (2006); see also, e.g., EDWARD FISCHEL, THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION 276-81 (Richard Jenery Shee trans., 2d ed. 1863); Van Vechten
Veeder, A Century of English Judicature, III: The Ecclesiastical and Admiralty
Courts, 13 GREEN BAG 131 (1901). It was staffed by lay judges, see FISCHEL, supra,
at 279; OUTHWAITE, supra, at 65, and its decisions were included in the standard
case reports, reflecting the Church of England’s unique status as the “Church by
law established.” See M.H. Ogilvie, What is a Church by Law Established?, 28
Osgoode Hall L.J. 179, 195-208 (1990); Charlotte Smith, The Church of England:
Some Historical Reflections on a Constitutional Conundrum, 56 N. IR. L.Q. 394
(2005). See generally Norman Doe, The Notion of a National Church: A Juridical
Framework, 149 L. & JUST. CHRISTIAN L. REV. 77 (2002). With respect to many of
the questions it addressed, the Court of Consistory stood out, not so much for
being ecclesiastical, but for being one of the few islands of civil law thinking in
the sea of English common law. Indeed, it shared judges, advocates, and space in
the fabled Doctors Commons with the admiralty courts, the other principal
“civilian” outpost in English law. See generally DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE
CIVILIAN WRITERS OF DOCTORS’ COMMONS, LONDON: THREE CENTURIES OF JURISTIC
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between Johanna Gordon and John William Henry
Dalrymple.2 Dalrymple was a young aristocrat living in
England but of Scottish ancestry.3 While stationed with His
Majesty’s Dragoon Guards in Edinburgh, Dalrymple had an
ongoing sexual relationship with Gordon, assuring her in
passionate letters that they were married, though without a
ceremony or other public acknowledgment, but also begging
her to keep the bond secret.4 Later, though, after moving back
to England, he denied the marriage and married someone
else.5 Gordon sued to enforce her rights as his wife.6
Lord Stowell held in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple that Scots
law applied, and that, unlike English law,7 it recognized the

INNOVATION IN COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988);
Veeder, supra, at 134. Lord Stowell himself was university-trained in the civil law
and was also an academic historian, having held the prestigious Camden
Professorship of Ancient History at Oxford. In addition to sitting on the
Consistory Court, he sat on the High Court of Admiralty, where he gained more
fame developing many of the formative doctrines of both private admiralty law
and public international law. See generally HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, SIR WILLIAM
SCOTT, LORD STOWELL: JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY, 1798-1828, at
38-41 (1987).
2. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B.) 666; 2 Hag. Con.
54, 54-55.
3. Id. at 666, 2 Hag. Con. at 55. In 1821, on the death of his cousin John
Dalrymple, John William Henry became the Seventh Earl of Stair. BURKE’S
PEERAGE, BARONETAGE AND KNIGHTAGE 3712 (Charles Mosley ed., 107th ed. 2003).
He died childless, having never remarried after the events described here, and
the line passed to a distant cousin. The current (and fourteenth) Earl of Stair,
John David James Dalrymple, id. at 3715, was in 2008 elected by the United
Kingdom’s hereditary peers to sit in the House of Lords. Earl of Stair,
PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/earl-of-stair/3137
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
4. Dalrymple, (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. at 666; 2 Hag. Con. at 54-55.
5. Id. at 667, 2 Hag. Con. at 58.
6. Id.
7. English law tightened the requirements for marriage in 1753. See Marriage
Act, 1753, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33 (also known as Lord Hardwicke’s Act and The
Clandestine Marriages Act). The exact state of the law in England before Lord
Hardwicke’s Act remains a matter of some dispute. See JOHN GILLIS, FOR BETTER,
FOR WORSE: BRITISH MARRIAGES, 1600 TO THE PRESENT 136, 139-42 (1985); R.B.
OUTHWAITE, CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1850, at 1-17, 19-20
(1995); Rebecca Probert, Control over Marriage in England and Wales, 1753-1823:
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validity of non-ceremonial (often called common-law8)
marriages.9 He decided in favor of Gordon on the basis of the
factual evidence presented and ordered Dalrymple to “receive
her home” as his wife and “treat her with conjugal
affection.”10
The most famous passage in Lord Stowell’s opinion in
Dalrymple, however, went well beyond the issue at hand to
summarize, with unusual power and elegance, a traditional
view of marriage itself and its several dimensions:
Marriage in its origin is a contract of natural law, it may exist
between two individuals of different sexes, although no third person
existed in the world, as happened in the case of the common
ancestors of mankind; it is the parent, not the child, of civil society,
“principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae” (Cic. De Off. l
17) In civil society it becomes a civil contract regulated and
prescribed by law and endowed with civil consequences. In most
civilized countries acting under a sense of the force of sacred
obligations it has had the sanctions of religion superadded: it then
becomes a religious as well as a natural and civil contract; for it is
a great mistake to suppose that because it is the one therefore it
may not likewise be the other.11

In writing these words, Lord Stowell did not have in mind the
contemporary debate over same-sex marriage. The case was

The Clandestine Marriages Act of 1753 in Context, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 413, 41318 (2009).
8. The term “common law marriage” is always confusing and parochial and in
contemporary parlance particularly misleading since its popular meaning—
cohabitation without a valid marriage—is so at odds with its legal meaning—
valid marriage without a ceremony. It is especially a misnomer in this particular
case, since neither Scots law nor, for that matter, English ecclesiastical law
(including its law of marriage) was a common law system.
9. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Rep. at 667, 675, 683; 2 Hag. Con. at 59, 82-83, 106.
As Lord Stowell emphasized, this principle was actually consistent with the longheld doctrine of canon law recognizing the validity of marriages entered into only
by the consent of the parties. See also Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58
EMORY L.J. 1123, 1146-48 (2009) (discussing history of non-ceremonial marriage
in canon and secular law, and outlining later developments) [hereinafter Holy
Secular Institution].
10. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Rep. at 693; 2 Hag. Con. at 137.
11. Id. at 669, 2 Hag. Con. at 63.
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a conventional nineteenth-century dispute.12 Still, Lord
Stowell’s reference to “two individuals of different sexes” was
not casual or insignificant. He and the tradition he embodied
thought of marriage as an institution grounded in “natural
law” precisely because of its connection to the procreative
potential of heterosexual sex. Marriage as the core of family
and family was the first building block of society. This is even
clearer from Lord Stowell’s Latin quotation from Cicero’s De
Officiis (“On [Moral] Duties”), which he extracted from a
passage that argues that:
[S]ince the reproductive instinct is by nature’s gift the common
possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that
between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and
children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And
this is the foundation of civil government [principium urbis], [and]
the nursery, as it were, of the state [quasi seminarium rei
publicae].13

Less clear, though, is whether Lord Stowell’s account
logically excluded the possibility of same-sex marriage.
Indeed, one might even imagine, if only in a fit of fanciful
anachronizing, that Lord Stowell, with his nuanced
appreciation of the complex character of marriage, might be
willing to say that “it is a great mistake to suppose that
because [marriage] is the one [which is to say, heterosexual]
it may not likewise be the other [which is to say,
homosexual.]”14
In the current debate over civil same-sex marriage,
proponents have tended—for strategic, ideological, and
12. That is not to suggest that the legal and cultural questions surrounding
non-ceremonial marriage are easy or uninteresting, see Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely
Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000);
Sonya C. Garza, Common Law Marriage: A Proposal for the Revival of a Dying
Doctrine, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541 (2006), only that Dalrymple neither raised nor
addressed any questions dramatically out of its own time and place.
13. CICERO, DE OFFFICIIS 57, bk. 1, § 17.54 (T.E. Page et al. eds., Walter Miller
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1928) (n.d.) (emphasis added).
14. I do not want to give the impression that Lord Stowell was what we would
call a progressive thinker. As a member of the House of Lords, for example, he
opposed ecclesiastical reforms affecting the Church of England and “spoke at
length and with special fervor in opposing Catholic emancipation in Ireland.”
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 1, at 51.
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intellectual reasons—to advance a “thin” conception of civil
marriage at odds, in at least three ways, with Lord Stowell’s
textured vision of three closely-connected but distinct layers.
First, they have sharply distinguished between the “secular”
and the “religious” aspects of marriage.15 Second, they have
emphasized the purely positive or enacted character of civil
marriage and have resisted portraying it as an institution
grounded in a more substantial normative narrative such as
natural law.16 Third, they have described the substance of
marriage itself in thin terms, in particular arguing against
any strong link between marriage and heterosexual sex and
procreation.17
In an earlier article titled A Holy Secular Institution, I
examined the first of these three moves. I suggested that the
claim that civil marriage is, in the words of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, a “wholly secular
institution” has several possible understandings.18 I then
argued that, on any of these understandings, the claim is
dubious. The “secular” and “religious” meanings and
institutions of marriage are so intermeshed in our history
and legal and religious imagination, that trying to wall off

15. See Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9, at 1125-26, 1126 n.4 (citing
sources).
16. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex
Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1199-1200 (1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Three Cultural Anxieties Undermining the Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 307, 309-10, 312-13 (1998); Andrew H. Friedman, SameSex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural, Canonical, and
Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 HOW. L.J. 173, 177-78 (1992); see
also, e.g., Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DePaul L.
Rev. 51, 57-58 (1998).
17. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 901-02 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961-62 (Mass. 2003); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO
CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 96-98 (1996); Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of
Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 13-15 (2010); Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay, Two
Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1706-07 (2010);
Culhane, supra note 16, at 1195-96; Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation”
Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.KENT L. REV. 403, 409-14 (2009).
18. Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9, at 1128-31.
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“civil marriage” from religious considerations is neither
possible nor desirable.”19
My Holy Secular Institution article was not a brief
against same-sex marriage, however. The intermeshing of
the secular and religious dimensions of marriage does have
consequences. But those consequences cut both ways. The
article’s goal was to “illuminate the playing field, not to score
points for one side or the other.”20
In this Article, I want to grapple with and connect the
other two respects in which many proponents of same-sex
marriage have thought it necessary to flatten marriage itself.
I suggest that both these moves are unnecessary to a defense
of same-sex marriage and potentially counterproductive.
Again, my goal is primarily analytic. I still believe that legal
scholarship needs to be sharply distinguished from briefwriting.21 Nevertheless, I do support the drive for same-sex
marriage, and this Article states that commitment more
directly than my earlier work. So it might be worth saying at
the start that, from the proponents’ point of view, getting the
argument “right” should be important not only as a matter of
intellectual integrity, but for several other reasons as well.
To begin with, arguments for same-sex marriage should
acknowledge the reasons that same-sex marriage is worth
fighting for.22 Simply put, to strip marriage of its deeper
content and resonance simply for the sake of defining it as an
institution so formless that it could then effortlessly
accommodate same-sex couples is not only ironic but
poignant.
19. Id. at 1123.
20. Id. at 1186.
21. Id. at 1130 n.14.
22. This is particularly important because many of the purely instrumental
benefits of marriage can be obtained by other means, ranging from private
contracts to parallel institutions such as civil unions. For efforts to make sense of
the residuum of difference between marriage and civil unions, see, for example,
Perry Dane, The Intersecting Worlds of Religious and Secular Marriage, in 4 LAW
AND RELIGION: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 385, 388 (Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Dane, Intersecting Worlds]; Misha Isaak, Comment,
“What’s in a Name?”: Civil Unions and the Constitutional Significance of
“Marriage,” 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 607, 610-21 (2008).
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To be sure, some theorists affirmatively seek to
deconstruct marriage. They find the very idea of marriage
inherently oppressive or essentialist or sexually constricting.
Indeed, some gay activists and “queer” theorists have been
cool to same-sex marriage precisely because they believe it
perpetuates a bankrupt institution.23 These might all be
respectable positions. But most gay couples who want to get
married, I suspect, are more conventional in their
motivations and their attitude to marriage. Many aspire to
experience marriage in all its “traditional” depth. They
formalize their bond ceremonially and often religiously. They
have and raise children and create families. In all ways but
one, they are often as committed to the existing paradigm of
marriage as the most vehement opponents of same-sex
marriage.
In addition to disserving many same-sex couples who
want to get married, the effort to hollow out the institution
also disserves many of the opponents of same-sex marriage.
The struggle for same-sex marriage, after some fits and
starts, has lately picked up perhaps unstoppable momentum.
As of this writing, seventeen states and the District of
Columbia have legalized same-sex marriage by legislation or
judicial decision.24 And in June 2013, the United States
Supreme Court, while punting on whether the Constitution
created a right to same-sex marriage as such,25 struck down
23. They also argue that same-sex marriage will simply replicate within the
gay community an invidious moral and economic division, which already afflicts
the straight world, between the married elite and the lesser unattached. See
NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 58-59 (2008); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH
NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 84-91 (1999).
24. See CNN Library, Same Sex Marriage Fast Facts, CNN (Jan. 21, 2014, 3:57
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/28/us/same-sex-marriage-fast-facts/. Only one
state at present recognizes “civil unions” that offer the legal incidents and benefits
of marriage without the status itself. Id.; cf. Dane, Intersecting Worlds, supra note
22, at 386-94 (discussing the possible meaning of civil unions as an alternative to
marriage); infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing civil unions as a
possible marker of the “difference between the paradigmatic heterosexual case of
marriage and its extension to same-sex couples”).
25. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660, 2668 (2013) (ordering
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to vacate for lack of appellate standing its
decision in Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) and affirming trial court
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Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which had
purported to deprive same-sex couples married under state
law of the incidents of marriage under federal law.26 In the
end though, arguments for same-sex marriage will only win
the day properly and conclusively if they honestly engage
with the instinct that opposes them.
More specifically, the same-sex marriage movement has
so far drawn on two slogans: “freedom to marry”27 and
“marriage equality.”28 Both slogans are incomplete and even
question-begging.29 Moreover, for all the movement’s
successes, a measurable minority of Americans, while
generally willing to accommodate gay rights and gay
equality, remain unconvinced that same-sex marriage is
necessarily part of that package of rights and equality.30 As a
decision striking down state constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage).
26. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683-84, 2696 (2013); cf.
infra note 178 (distinguishing the issues raised in Windsor from the more general
debate over same-sex marriage); infra note 186 (discussing recent federal District
Courts relying on Windsor to strike down state bans on same-sex marriage).
27. Evan Wolfson, one of the important activists throughout the whole struggle
for same-sex marriage (and one of my college suitemates) wrote his Harvard Law
School thesis on gay “freedom to marry” in 1983. A formal National Freedom to
Marry Coalition came together in 1993 in the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court
decision in Baehr v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). See Evan Wolfson, The
Hawaii Marriage Case Launches the US Freedom-to-Marry Movement for
Equality, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 170 (Robert Wintemute &
Mads Andenæs eds., 2001); see also, e.g., Evan Wolfson, The Freedom to Marry:
Our Struggle for the Map of the Country, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 209 (1996). Evan
is still the president of Freedom to Marry, Inc.
28. Though the idea of equal treatment was always part of the movement for
same-sex marriage, the slogan of “marriage equality” has only in more recent
years seemed to gain prominence and even often displace “freedom to marry” for
rhetorical pride of place. This is apparent, for example, in the Human Rights
Campaign’s marriage equality logo, the names of many state same-sex marriage
advocacy groups such as Marriage Equality California, and the titles given to
legislation such as the Marriage Equality Act in New York, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 10-a-10-b (McKinney 2011).
29. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1377-80 (2010).
30. In one typical poll a few years ago, 47% of the respondents thought it should
be “legal . . . for gay and lesbians couples to get married” but 66 percent thought
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purely tactical matter, perhaps another approach might be
added to the mix. More fundamentally, norms of civil
discourse and interpersonal respect should look askance at
arguments—such as “freedom to marry” and “marriage
equality”—that treat the class of Americans generally
friendly to gay rights and gay equality but skeptical of samesex marriage as bigots.31 However current public sentiment

they should “be allowed to form legally recognized civil unions, giving them the
legal rights of married couples in areas such as health insurance, inheritance and
pension coverage.” Washington Post—ABC News Poll, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Feb.
4-8,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
politics/polls/postpoll_021010.html. The latest polling shows that somewhat more
than half of Americans now support same-sex marriage. See Robert P. Jones,
Daniel Cox & Juhem Navarro-Rivera, A Shifting Landscape: A Decade of Change
in American Attitudes About Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Issues, PUB.
RELIGION RES. INST. 1, 8 (Feb. 26, 2014), http://publicreligion.org/site/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/2014.LGBT_REPORT.pdf (reporting 53% overall
support for same-sex marriage and providing geographical, religious, age, and
other breakdowns). Even that unprecedentedly high support for full-scale samesex marriage, though, is less than the percentage several years ago who supported
either marriage or rights equivalent to marriage, suggesting that a fair number
of Americans still support most essential aspects of gay equality short of marriage
itself.
31. Such claims that the views of same-sex marriage opponents amount to
nothing more than bigotry have been particularly apparent recently, precisely
when support for same-sex marriage in some circles has turned into a rhetorical
truism. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013):
In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of proponents’ case is an
inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition 8
was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not as good
as opposite-sex couples. Whether that belief is based on moral
disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards gays and lesbians or
simply a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman is
inherently better than a relationship between two men or two women,
this belief is not a proper basis on which to legislate. See . . . Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (“[T]he
Constitution cannot control [private biases] but neither can it tolerate
them.”).
See also, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19110 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13,
2014) (linking the opposition to same-sex marriage by Virginia legislators and
votes to “unlawful prejudice.”); José Gabilondo, Marriage Equality a Step to End
Bigotry
Toward
Gays,
MIAMI
HERALD
(July
12,
2013),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/12/3497598/marriage-equality-a-step-to-
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is trending, the debate about same-sex marriage is genuinely
difficult, and arguments in favor of same-sex marriage
should both acknowledge that difficulty and understand it.
Accepting that the call for same-sex marriage cannot
adequately rest on slogans such as “freedom” or “equality”
can also be understood as an invitation to articulate more
nuanced, and possibly more contingent, justifications,
arguments that—without condemning the entire history of
marriage to this point—grapple more powerfully with the
specific conditions of the present age that would lead many
same-sex couples to seek marriage as both a legal
relationship and a cultural marker of their bond. Later in this
paper, I suggest one direction that exploration might take,
but the more important point is that the project to develop
more specific justifications, whatever exact shape it takes,
can itself empower all the parties to the debate.
Even if I am misreading the sentiments of both sides of
the debate, however, proponents of same-sex marriage
should be wary, on both principled and strategic grounds, of
trying to broaden marriage only by first flattening it,
particularly if alternative arguments are available. First, the
move grants too much to opponents of same-sex marriage. It
implies that if the details of the “traditional” heterosexual
conception of marriage remain sound, the move to extend
marriage to same-sex couples is unsound. But, as I
demonstrate in this Article, the two can coexist.

end.html (after the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor, “it just became harder
to act like a bigot without being called out as one”).
Importantly, not all supporters of same-sex marriage accuse the opposition of
bigotry. Some who have been involved in the struggle the longest actively dispute
the assumption. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, A Time-Line of Marriage Equality,
THE DISH (June 3, 2013), http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2013/06/03/a-time-lineof-marriage-equality/ (“My one complaint is the use of the term “bigots” to
describe anyone opposed to marriage equality. Some are; many aren’t. And the
use of the word does nothing to help engage opponents of equality—and merely
reeks of the Maddow-like smugness that encourages the foes of equality to dig
in.”). Cf. Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89
IND. L.J. 27, 29, 40-42 (2014) (arguing that if the Supreme Court strikes down
laws banning same-sex marriage, it should not “obfuscat[e]” the matter by relying
on a finding of illicit animus).
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Second, hollowing out the substantive undergirding of
marriage invites the “line-drawing problem” that I have
described as the “knottiest and stubbornest difficulty that
confronts the argument for same-sex marriage.”32 Briefly, if
the possibility of marriage is extended to same-sex couples,
why not also extend it to all manner of other human
associations—close relatives,33 non-intimate friends, plural
groups, and so on? This sort of litany is a staple of arguments
against same-sex marriage, and it requires the sort of careful
and precise response that only a robust account of marriage
can sustain.
Again, extending marriage to same-sex couples might
well inspire a healthy broader discussion about both the
boundaries of marriage and whether civil marriage should
exist at all. I suggest here, however, that expanding the
institution of marriage to include same-sex couples does not
require resolving those deeper arguments about the
character of marriage and its place in human relations, and
that those arguments can and should proceed at their own
pace even in the wake of such an expansion.
This paper proceeds in four steps. Part I outlines a
certain type of natural law account of marriage as a bond
“between two individuals of different sexes.” My aim in this
first section is not to argue definitively in favor of that
natural law account, though I do find it attractive and even
compelling on several grounds, but rather to posit it,
arguendo in the lawyer’s lingo, so I can move on to the rest of
the paper. I will, though, try to explicate some of the
implications of the argument.
The next two parts of the paper then explore why
assuming even this strong proposition about the character of
marriage does not exclude the possibility of strong arguments
for same-sex marriage. Part II argues an essentially negative
point: although positing that heterosexual marriage is an
institution of natural law might have important normative
consequences, it does not, consistent with the natural law
32. Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9, at 1179-80.
33. The problem is not whether recognizing same-sex marriage will lead down
the slippery slope to legitimizing incest. Rather, the question is why a hollowedout account of marriage should continue to connect marriage to potential sex in
the first place.

302

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

tradition broadly understood, necessarily exclude same-sex
marriage.
Part III looks at how such an argument to extend
marriage to same-sex couples might be constructed. Its aim
is to move beyond conventional equality arguments that
draw their force from so thoroughly hollowing out the
conception of marriage that it then becomes “irrational” to
deny it to same-sex couples. Instead, I give an account of
another form of argument, which I call “analogy of dignity,”
that, although rarely noted as such, has often been used to
extend legal rights or institutions beyond their paradigmatic
cases. I then suggest, briefly, how the argument from
“analogy of dignity” might work in the same-sex marriage
context, and what its implications might be, including the
consequences of my argument for the various legal debates
surrounding same-sex marriage.
Part IV concludes by asking the fraught human question
lurking throughout the paper—whether my alternative
argument for same-sex marriage grounded in “analogy of
dignity” actually does justice to the dignity of its own
aspirations. I argue that it does, and more.
Before plunging in, a few words about methodology,
terminology, and how the parts of the article connect to each
other. Parts I and II discuss “natural law.” Some natural law
accounts tie arguments about marriage to views about the
morality of homosexual conduct. Mine do not. Period. Even
so, I have mixed feelings about framing my own analysis in
natural law terms. I am skeptical of certain aspects of
natural law thinking writ large.34 But I do think it important,
at least (but not only) for the sake of argument, to make the
most highly charged case possible for the normative
coherence of heterosexual marriage. Natural law discourse,
whatever its larger role, helps provide that language. And it
is helpful, in Part II, to draw on that same natural law
tradition to explain why the arguments in Part I need not be
the last word. In sum, it is useful and enlightening to think
through the implications of natural law analysis at least in
34. See generally Perry Dane, The Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, in
THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (Donald Earl Childress III ed.,
2010) [hereinafter Dane, Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law].

2014]

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

303

part to force a more complete account of both the limits and
the surprising force of positive law.35 Moreover, only by
framing the issue in terms of natural law can we then try to
make sense of both the power and the limits of positive law.
Nevertheless, I do not want to get bogged down in larger
jurisprudential debates. Thus, I also argue in Part I that
marriage can be understood as a “paradigmatically”
heterosexual institution. Even by itself, this is an important
claim, though weaker than to say that heterosexual marriage
is an institution grounded in natural law. In that same spirit,
the argument in Part II, stripped of its natural law
particulars, can just be read to say that identifying a
paradigm case does not in itself exclude the possibility of
other cases beyond the paradigm.
The term “paradigm” has its own difficulties and
ambiguities.36 With respect to marriage, it might refer to
linguistic understandings of the word.37 Or it might refer to
sociological consensus about the proper scope of marriage. Or
it might take on a more directly normative sense. My sense
of “paradigm” draws on both the linguistic and sociological
but is most directly normative. Thus, to say that marriage is
paradigmatically heterosexual, in my sense, is to say that the
normative undergirding of marriage—the reason that
marriage exists in the first place—assumes the heterosexual
case.
Part III of the Article—which discusses “analogy of
dignity” and its implications for the same-sex marriage
debate—takes up the invitation extended in Part II. But Part
III can also stand alone as a demonstration of how to extend
an institution or legal rule such as marriage without
35. As James Bernard Murphy emphasizes in his important study THE
PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW: FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE (2005), the
discourses of natural law and positive law, rather than necessarily opposing each
other, have historically evolved in tandem, suggesting a deeply symbiotic
relationship between the two.
36. I thank Doug Husak for helping me think through this ambiguity.
37. For a compelling philosophical critique of arguments against same-sex
marriage that rely on current linguistic usage, see Adèle Mercier, Meaning and
Necessity: Can Semantics Stop Same-Sex Marriage?, 8 ESSAYS PHIL. Iss. 1, Article
14 (2007), http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol8/iss1/14.
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rejecting the normative force or coherence of its paradigmatic
core. Part III and Part IV make fewer specific references to
the natural law tradition, although its spirit remains just
below the surface, and I do come full circle at the very end of
the Article with a brief reflection on how resort to “analogy of
dignity” might have a place in the natural law dialectic itself
more broadly conceived.38
I. MARRIAGE AS A NATURAL INSTITUTION
As noted, many proponents of same-sex marriage, and
many contemporary writers about marriage more generally,
reject or discount the character of marriage as a “natural”
institution. They speak of it as entirely a creature of positive
law, like a licensing or registration statute.39 To be sure, some
of this allergy to natural law views of marriage is
understandable. As noted, some natural law accounts relate
arguments about the nature of marriage to views about the
morality of homosexual conduct. More generally, same-sex
marriage opponents in the “new natural law” tradition have
argued that such unions are excluded by the very definition
of marriage, understood as a natural law constraint dictated
by right reason and a proper appreciation of the common
good.40
The natural law argument here is different and more
modest, though I suggest more faithful to the broad sweep of
natural law discourse over the centuries among both
philosophers and lawyers. As already emphasized, my
argument says nothing about the morality of homosexual sex.
38. See infra notes 215-218 and accompanying text.
39. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
2081 (2005).
40. See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1064-65 (1994); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley,
Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 304 (1995); Robert P.
George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106
YALE L.J. 2475, 2499 (1997). For a recent important effort to reframe these
arguments for a broader audience, see SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON &
ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE?: MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012). See
also Gerald V. Bradley, Three Liberal—but Mistaken—Arguments for Same-Sex
Marriage, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 45 (2008).
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More generally, my excursus into natural law does not claim
even to attempt any sort of comprehensive account of “the
basic forms of human flourishing” or the standards of
“practical thinking” of the sort emphasized by the “new
natural law” thinkers.41
A.
That said, I want to describe here, in brief and broad
terms, an idea of heterosexual marriage as an institution of
natural law, or at least as an institution that runs much
deeper than the fiats of particular state licensing regimes.
My aim is not to prove the force of that idea, although I
sympathize with it and will have some things to say about
why I do. In any event, I do not claim—in fact, I deny—that
this account of the “natural” dimension of the marriage
necessarily exhausts the potential social, linguistic, or legal
meaning of marriage writ large. I explain how the two might
diverge in Part II of this Article.
The natural law tradition comes in many flavors. As just
noted, I do not try to rely here on any single, completely
theorized, system.42 I have elsewhere suggested, though, that
41. For relevant examples of the “new natural law” tradition, see, for example,
JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (2d ed. 2011). See also,
e.g., GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM (3d ed. 1988); Robert P. George, Natural Law and
Human Nature, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 31 (Robert P.
George ed., 1992); Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle & John Finnis, Practical
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 99 (1987).
Work in this tradition, however, does not in any way exhaust even contemporary
natural law discourse. For critiques of the “new natural law” and alternative
accounts, see, for example, RUSSELL HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL
LAW THEORY (1987); RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE
NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD (2003); Alasdair MacIntyre, Theories
of Natural law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity, in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 91 (Edward B. McLean ed., 2000); Ralph
McInerny, The Principles of Natural Law, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1980). My own threepronged approach to natural law, see infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text,
resonates with these critiques of the “new natural law,” not so much in its
eclecticism as in its determination that natural thinking must take into account
not only abstract first principles but “knowledge of the world,” McInerny, supra,
at 11.
42. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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natural law traditions, broadly speaking, tend to combine
some sort of “normative realism, the view that normative
statements can be true” with “a sort of connection—a hinge
or hook—between the normative truths of moral realism, or
some of them, and the social phenomenon of law, or some of
it.”43
More to the point, perhaps, natural law claims of the sort
that Lord Stowell probably had in mind gain whatever force
they have from several converging lines of thought.44 One of
these is simply reflection or meditation on the characteristics
and essential needs of human beings and human societies.
Another is a sort of rough empiricism, an anthropological
search for universal features of human organization that
might suggest a relevant consensus.45 The third is partly a

43. Dane, Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, supra note 34, at 143.
44. The overlap of these various forms of argument, even at the cost of a certain
rigor, is a very old and arguably inevitable feature of the broad Western natural
law tradition. Brian Tierney, discussing both fourteenth-century and
seventeenth-century debates about natural rights to property, points out the
common if often criticized temptation to appeal:
[T]o a primeval state of nature as a starting point for arguments about
the right ordering of society. This kind of argument was made possible
by the ambiguities inherent in our word “nature. . . .” “Natural” can refer
to a primeval state of affairs before the institution of any human laws or
customs or conventions; or the word can refer to the intrinsic, permanent
characteristics of human beings as self-aware, moral, rational creatures.
. . . The attempt to derive natural rights and natural law from human
reason may be a worthwhile enterprise; an appeal to simple primitivism
seems at first sight merely naive. And yet this latter approach appears
to satisfy some deep instinctive tendency of the human mind.
BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS, STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS,
NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625, at 133-34 (1997) [hereinafter
TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS].
45. Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn, Universal Values and Anthropological Relativism, in
MODERN EDUCATION AND HUMAN VALUES: PITTCAIRN-CRABBE FOUNDATION
LECTURE SERIES 4, at 87, 105 (1952) (“[T]he mere existence of universals after so
many millennia of culture history and in such diverse environments suggests that
they correspond to something extremely deep in man’s nature and/or are
necessary conditions to social life.”).
For a classic defense of this approach, coming out of the Scottish Enlightenment,
see SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH, A DISCOURSE ON THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF NATURE
AND NATIONS 35-36 (1835):
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reflection of the first two but can also be conceptualized on
its own: a counterfactual examination of what rights and
institutions might exist even in the absence of formal legal
rules or even organized societies. This is the familiar idea of
a “state of nature” found in a range of natural law accounts.
The existence of a “state of nature” need not, of course, be an
actual historical claim.46 Even as a thought experiment, it
need not even be located in the past at all; it is just as
interesting to ask, in the manner of apocalyptic fiction, which
basic features of proto-juridical human organization would
“naturally” start to constitute themselves if all present
systems of government and positive law just disappeared. In
this sense, the point of the counterfactual “state of nature” is
not to exclude social relations, or put all persons behind a veil
of ignorance, but simply to imagine how a minimum
normative world might begin to be built.
Keeping all that in mind, the argument for heterosexual
marriage as an institution of natural law is almost
embarrassingly straightforward. Strains of it also resemble,
History . . . is now a vast museum, in which specimens of every variety
of human nature may be studied. From these great accessions to
knowledge, lawgivers and statesmen, but, above all, moralists and
political philosophers, may reap the most important instruction. They
may plainly discover in all the useful and beautiful variety of
governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of
usages and rites which have prevailed among men, the same
fundamental, comprehensive truths, the sacred master principles which
are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered (with few
and slight exceptions) by every nation upon earth, and uniformly taught
(with still fewer exceptions) by a succession of wise men from the first
dawn of speculation to the present moment.
One need not share Mackintosh’s optimism about the existence of “sacred master
principles” to see at least some utility in testing moral and political intuitions
against the actual experience of humankind. See, e.g., Michael Freeman,
Anthropology and the Democratisation of Human Rights, INT’L J. HUM. RTS., Oct.
9, 2002, at 37, 42; Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human
Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56, 65-66 (1988).
46. See Richard Ashcraft, Locke’s State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral
Fiction?, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 898, 900 n.14 (1968) (“Locke believed it possible to
use the state of nature as a ‘truth-concept,’ not only because it referred to actual
human history, but also because, properly stated, it set forth the logical and moral
conditions of human existence. And, because it described the ‘nature of things,’ it
was true.”).
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though in a different register whose implications I will draw
out below, arguments already heard in the same-sex
marriage debate.
As a reflection on human nature, the argument goes like
this: heterosexual sex has the unique feature of potentially
and even unintentionally leading to procreation. It is
therefore uniquely appropriate—even necessary—to have a
vehicle through which such potentially procreative
heterosexual sex can be legitimized, recognized, and
embedded in a set of personally and socially recognized
rights, obligations, and bonds of love and loyalty between the
members of the couple and between both of them and their
offspring. Along the same lines, it seems appropriate for
marriage to be not only a form of understanding between two
people (even if “no third person existed in the world”) but also
a bond between that couple and their children, and a basic
building block of society—in Cicero’s terms, “the nursery . . .
of the state.”47 It also makes sense to plant in both lone
individuals and in the collective understanding at least some
preference for sexual relations between men and women to
be channeled into that set-apart status of marriage, even if
the tone and severity of that preference might take any of
several forms.48 Finally, it bears emphasis that this
conception of marriage does not see it as merely the engine
for reproduction. Heterosexual men and women, given their
sexual “natures,” will be attracted to each other and love each
other with all the depth that romantics and poets and lovers
themselves can imagine. They will also love their children.
Marriage, however, structures and frames those feelings and
relations, even as it places constraints on them and attaches
them more self-consciously to interpersonal moral
constraints and assumptions, a social context, and a web of
interconnected institutional assumptions. Marriage, in its
natural dimension, is thus a set of ideas—like promise or
property or liberty—about the matrix of rights, obligations,
47. See CICERO, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
48. Thus, even in contemporary American culture, in which premarital sex is
widely accepted, broad swaths of the population still think of it as pre-marital
sex, which is to say as either a time-bound period of experimentation and play
before settling down or even as a form of rehearsal for marriage itself. See MARK
REGNERUS & JEREMY UECKER, PREMARITAL SEX IN AMERICA 70-71 (2011).
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and expectations that shape the normative narrative of
ordinary life.
This reflective argument is then buttressed by two other
converging lines of inquiry. First, marriage as the socially
recognized vehicle for heterosexual bonding and for
potentially reproducing the generations does, in some form,
turn out to be about as close to a cultural universal as human
society gets, in a small select company with “law,
government, religion, conceptions of self, . . . family, and
kinship.”49 It is, even with all its complex and fascinating
variations, part of the common normative and institutional
template for our species.50
49. ABRAHAM ROSMAN, PAULA G. RUBEL & MAXINE K. WEISGRAU, THE TAPESTRY
13 (9th ed. 2009); see
also Steven W. Gangestad, Martie G. Haselton & David M. Buss, Evolutionary
Foundations of Cultural Variation: Evoked Culture and Mate Preferences, 17
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 75, 75 (2006) (“[A]lthough marriage arrangements vary widely
across human societies, long-term, culturally recognized, and sanctioned pair
bonds occur in all human groups.”). To be sure, social scientists have identified a
few apparent exceptions to the universality of some form of an instution of
marriage. See, e.g., CAI HUA, A SOCIETY WITHOUT FATHERS OR HUSBANDS: THE NA
OF CHINA (Asti Hustvedt trans., 2001) (discussing the Na of China). It is
unnecessary for my limited purposes here to venture into the extensive debate
over the precise meaning and significance of such examples.
OF CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

50. Sociologists have identified some examples of apparent same-sex marriage
in the diversity of human cultures. For discussions of marriages between women
in some traditional African cultures, see, for example, Judith Shapiro,
Transsexualism: Reflections on the Persistence of Gender and the Mutability of
Sex, in SAME-SEX CULTURES AND SEXUALITIES: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER 138,
150-52 (Jennifer Robertson ed., 2005); Saskia Wieringa, Women Marriages and
Other Same-Sex Practices: Historical Reflections on African Women’s Same-Sex
Relations, in TOMMY BOYS, LESBIAN MEN AND ANCESTRAL WIVES: FEMALE SAMESEX PRACTICES IN AFRICA 281 (Ruth Morgan & Saskia Wieringa eds., 2006);
Regina Smith Oboler, Is the Female Husband a Man? Woman/Woman Marriage
Among the Nandi of Kenya, 19 ETHNOLOGY 69 (1980). For discussions of same-sex
marriages in some Native American cultures, see, for example, WALTER L.
WILLIAMS, THE SPIRIT AND THE FLESH: SEXUAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN INDIAN
CULTURE (1986); Charles Callender & Lee M. Kochems, The North American
Berdache, 24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 443 (1983); see also WILL ROSCOE,
CHANGING ONES: THE THIRD AND FOURTH GENDERS IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA
(1998).
The debate over the precise character and function of these sorts of marriages and
the various forms they take in different cultures is unending and complex and
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that such marriages typically
involve some complicating factor, whether it is complex gender-identity (as in the
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Second, it is also easy to see how a society in an imagined
“state of nature,” whether primordial or post-apocalyptic,
would soon appreciate the need for something along the lines
of an institution of marriage, which is to say sociallyrecognized pair bonds woven into the emerging (if still
tenuous) fabric of social organization, channeling (whether
strictly or not) potentially procreative sex and accompanied
by (even only informally) enforceable obligations of
exclusivity, mutual support, care for offspring, and stability
over time.51

Native American case) or complex family structures (as in some of the African
cases where a woman already married to a man might in turn marry a woman for
various procreative or economic reasons), or even in some contexts the lack of any
expectation of sexual relations. That is to say, while one need not doubt the reality
and importance of such same-sex marriages, they were not in any culture simply
assimilated unproblematically into a larger undifferentiated category of
“marriage” that includes both same-sex and opposite-sex bonds. They thus lend
little support to a contemporary notion of “marriage equality” as such, though
they might in a loose way be some precedent for the idea promoted in this Article,
see infra notes 162-79 and accompanying text, of understanding same-sex
marriage as a “horizontal extension” of the traditional institution of heterosexual
marriage.
Much the same could be said about John Boswell’s classic study of Western
medieval rituals formalizing deep bonds among men. See generally JOHN
BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994). Even putting aside the
debate between Boswell and many of his critics as to whether these rituals were
about homosexual bonds or something else—friendship or alliance relations, for
example—the fact remains that the rituals that Boswell identified at best
functioned as metaphoric extensions rather than simply straightforward
examples of the institution of marriage.
51. I am thinking here, for example, of the classic novel The Day of the Triffids
by John Wyndham, in which factions in a post-apocalyptic society experiment
with various vehicles for organizing the perpetuation of the race, some of them
quite horrific, with something very much like non-ceremonial marriage
apparently winning the day as both the most humane and the most stable
solution. JOHN WYNDHAM, THE DAY OF THE TRIFFIDS 185 (1951) (“So I’m to be a
farmer’s wife. Anyway, I like being married to you, Bill—even if it isn’t a very
proper, authentic kind of marriage.”). To be sure, the characters in the novel are
influenced by the norms of the old pre-apocalyptic order; this is not a state of
nature behind a “veil of ignorance.” But, as I suggested earlier in text, that
actually makes the story more useful, not less, since it explores precisely which
of the characters’ old habits would be discarded and which would find themselves
reemerging once the coercive power of the state and the stabilizing influence of
an ordered society were devastatingly removed.
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The subtle transition from a post-apocalyptic “state of nature” to the
reconstruction of explicit institutional forms takes more direct center stage in
George R. Stewart’s 1949 novel Earth Abides. Almost a third of the way through
the story, Ish and Em, two survivors of the fall of civilization from a worldwide
plague, join together:
For a wild moment he had an idea that they might say some kind of
marriage vows. Quakers could marry themselves. Why couldn’t others?
. . . And then he sensed that the mere babbling of words was in itself
much more dishonest even than a straightforward feeling for the knee
under the table.
GEORGE R. STEWART, EARTH ABIDES 113 (1949). A generation later, though:
The Year 16 . . . was remarkable because the first marriage actually took
place. Those married were Mary, who was Ish’s and Em’s oldest
daughter, and Ralph, who had been born to Molly just before the Great
Disaster. They were younger than would have been thought suitable or
even decent for marriage in the Old Days, but in this also standards had
changed.
....
Maurine and Molly and Jean were all for “a real wedding,” as they said.
They hunted up a Löhengrin record for the wind-up phonograph, and
were making a wedding costume in white with a veil, and everything to
go with it. But to Ish, all this seemed a horrible parody of things that had
once been; Em, in her quiet way, supported him. Since Mary was their
daughter, they controlled the wedding. In the end, they had no ceremony
at all, except that Ralph and Mary stood before Ezra, and he told them
that now they were being married and that they would assume a new
responsibility to the community that they must try to fulfill as well. Mary
bore a child before the year was out, and so for that reason, it was called
the Year of the Grandchild.
Id. at 155-56. Cicero and Lord Stowell would have understood this story
completely. They might have argued, though, as I would, that a “ceremony” did
actually take place.
The science fiction movie Logan’s Run, which does posit at least a translucent veil
of ignorance, also poignantly suggests the bottom-up power of marriage. In the
movie, humanity has retreated to a computer-controlled environment in which
persons are incubated in machines and killed on their thirtieth birthdays; they
therefore know nothing about either procreation or aging. The two protagonists,
Logan and Jessica, escape and eventually meet an “old man” who tries to explain
the words they have seen on tombstones in a cemetery: “Beloved Husband,”
“Beloved Son,” “Beloved Wife.” “My father was the husband and my mother was
the wife. ‘Beloved’ is a word they used—to stay together. . . . So people stayed
together for that feeling of love. They would live and raise children together and
be remembered.” Logan and Jessica, with the “old man’s” blessing, then bring the
institution of marriage back to life for themselves as she whispers “Beloved
husband” and he kisses her, saying “Beloved wife.” David Zelag Goodman,
Logan’s Run (1976) Movie Script (Apr. 30, 1975), http://sfy.ru/?script=logans_run.
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The post-apocalyptic thought experiment emphasizes
that marriage can have an important interpersonal and
collective reality even apart from the collection of more
mundane legal incidents—tax benefits and the like—that
attend it in advanced industrial society. It also illustrates
why this view of marriage has nothing to do with a
devaluation of homosexual sex. One can imagine that a
society struggling to reorganize itself from the ground up
would value and respect the same-sex attractions of some of
its members and their love for each other without seeing the
need to attach to gay sexual relations an expectation that
they will be channeled into a particular socially embedded
form of expression, or that they will be stable and exclusive
or involve bonds of mutual support as well as affection, or
that their pair bonds will be the nucleus of the larger units
through which humanity projects reproduces, or—in sum—
that the proto-society will make available to gay persons a
proto-institution such as “natural” marriage built around
those expectations.52
B.
The argument here is more or less the one that Lord
Stowell and Cicero had in mind when they discussed the
“natural” character of marriage. In its broadest outlines, it
was also once a commonplace in Western philosophical and
To be sure, science fiction authors have also created a host of less conventional
forms of marriage or alternatives to marriage. Some of these, however, can be
understood as efforts to unpack and reconfigure the immanent logic of the
institution.
52. I am not suggesting, as both some conservatives, see, for example, Lynn D.
Wardle, The Biological Causes and Consequences of Homosexual Behavior and
Their Relevance for Family Law Policies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1016-24 (2007),
and some queer theorists, MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX,
POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999); Lisa Duggan, The New
Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism, in MATERIALIZING
DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A REVITALIZED CULTURAL POLITICS 175 (Russ Castronovo &
Dan Nelson eds., 2002); Carl Wittman, A Gay Manifesto, GAYHOMELAND.ORG
(1970), http://library.gayhomeland.org/0006/EN/A_Gay_Manifesto.htm, have,
that gay culture distinctively embraces changeable or non-exclusive relations. To
the contrary, my point simply goes to whether a society building itself from
scratch would find a need to provide a proto-institutional framework for such
expectations.
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legal thought. John Locke, for example, whose views on the
right of married couples to specify the terms of their contract
and even to terminate it were well ahead of their time, still
conceptualized marriage as a “a voluntary compact between
man and woman.”53 Moses Mendelssohn, as part of his
argument for the centrality of “natural liberty,”54 held that
marriage is “nothing other than an agreement between two
persons of different sexes to bring children into the world;
and upon this agreement rests the entire system of their
mutual duties and rights.”55
53. God having made Man such a creature, that in his own Judgment, it
was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong Obligations of
Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into society, as well
as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it.
The first society was between Man and Wife, which gave beginning to
that between Parents and Children; to which, in time, that between
Master and Servant came to be added: And though all these might . . .
make up but one family, wherein the Master or Mistress of it had some
sort of Rule proper to a family. . . .
Conjugal Society is made by a voluntary Compact between Man and
Woman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a Communion and Right in one
another’s Bodies as is necessary to its chief End, Procreation; yet it draws
with it mutual Support and Assistance, and a Communion of Interests
too, as necessary not only to unite their Care and Affection, but also
necessary to their common Off-spring, who have a right to be nourished,
and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 336-37 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
54. MOSES MENDELSSOHN, JERUSALEM 52 (Allan Arkush trans., Univ. Press of
New England 1983) (1783).
55. Id. at 50. His argument, more completely, was that:
Whoever helps to beget a being capable of felicity is obligated, by the laws
of nature, to promote its felicity, as long as it is not yet able to provide
for its own advancement. . . . [And] by the act itself, the parents have
agreed to assist each other in this respect, that is, to discharge together
their duty of conscience. In a word: the parents, through the very act of
cohabitation, have entered into a state of matrimony. They have made a
tacit contract to render capable of felicity, that is, to educate, the being,
destined for felicity, for whose coming into the world they are jointly
responsible.
All the duties and rights of the state of matrimony flow quite naturally
from this principle. . . . The duty to educate follows from the agreement
to beget children; and the obligation to set up a common household
follows from the common duty of education. Marriage, therefore, is, in
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But this notion of marriage as “natural” is not merely
academic or antiquarian. Simply by virtue of being a “natural
law” argument, it helps suggest why people care about
marriage so deeply. It provides a coherent vantage point from
which to mediate between marriage’s character as a cultural
universal and the often radically different instantiations of
marriage in different times and places. It makes it easier to
understand the special place that marriage and even the
right to marry have in our moral and constitutional
discourse. It renders intelligible, for example, Justice
Douglas’s famous peroration in Griswold v. Connecticut, that
“We deal here with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights.”56 And it helps make sense of the argument of some
opponents of same-sex marriage—an argument I ultimately
reject in this Article57—that extending marriage to same-sex
couples is not merely mistaken as a matter of policy or morals
but actually intrudes the government into a question beyond
its legitimate jurisdiction.58
Jurisprudence and jurisdiction aside, this sort of natural
account of marriage also helps make sense of the specific
characteristics of marriage as an institution. Human life
generates a variety of distinct forms of organization and
interaction, but no other looks quite like marriage because no
other arises out of the same complex of facts and needs as
marriage. Friendship, for example, can be just as deep as
sexual love, but it does not require—indeed, is sometimes
defined by the lack of—formal expectations and obligations.59
Close biological kinship includes various firm obligations, but
excludes the very element that helps define marriage—sex.
The list goes on.

reality, nothing other than an agreement between two persons of
different sexes to bring children into the world; and upon this agreement
rests the entire system of their mutual duties and rights.
Id.
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
57. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
58. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (citing sources).
59. I discuss this point in more detail in Holy Secular Institution, supra note
9, at 1182.
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Finally, the “natural” account of marriage, as Lord
Stowell powerfully articulated, helps both make sense of the
potential religious significance of marriage and locate that
religious significance in a form of understanding that need
not be exclusively religious. Indeed, religious traditions
themselves recognize this point explicitly. In Catholic
thought, for example, marriage is a universal, natural
institution that then (only) for Christians is raised to the
level of a sacrament, and (only) for Catholics becomes further
subject to the Church’s own jurisdiction regarding matters of
form.60 Similarly, Jewish law considers marriage between
Jews to be a distinctive juridical and spiritual institution, but
also recognizes (though this has been under-theorized in
classical Jewish thought) that all societies can establish
forms of “natural” marriage of their own.61 Mainstream
Protestant thought, meanwhile, as my earlier Article
explains in much more detail, rejects the sacramental view of
marriage and for that matter does not believe that there is
such a thing as a distinctively “religious marriage” separate
from the civil authority of the state62 but does treat marriage
both as a natural institution in the divine order of creation
and as a sacred type of the relation of Christ to his Church.63
60. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1601-1608, 1621, 1659-1661
(U.S. Catholic Conference trans., 1994); THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 740-44, canons 1055-1059 (James A. Coriden et al. eds., 1985);
Timothy J. Buckley, The Bond of Marriage, in MARRIAGE IN THE CATHOLIC
TRADITION 88, 88-89 (Todd A. Saltzman et al. eds., 2004); Todd A. Saltzman,
Friendship, Sacrament, and Marriage: The Distinction between Christian Marital
Friendship and Non-Christian Marital Friendship, in MARRIAGE IN THE CATHOLIC
TRADITION, 115, 119-20 (Todd A. Saltzman et al. eds., 2004).
61. See Michael Broyde, The Covenant-Contract Dialectic in Jewish Marriage
and Divorce Law, in COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 53, 68-69
(John Witte, Jr. & Eliza Ellison eds., 2005); David Novak, Jewish Marriage:
Nature, Covenant, and Contract, in COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 26, 27 (John Witte, Jr. & Eliza Ellison eds., 2005). For the various
strands in early Rabbinic thinking about marriage, see generally MICHAEL L.
SATLOW, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN ANTIQUITY (2001).
62. Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9, at 1160-62.
63. In the classic words of the Anglican BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1662) (with
spellings modernized):
DEARLY beloved, we are gathered together here in the sight of God, and
in the face of this congregation, to join together this Man and this Woman
in holy Matrimony; which is an honourable estate, instituted of God in
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In all these views, however, the religious dimension is
intertwined with the more universal instinct that something
like marriage is a fundamental building block of human life
both as a primary bond for individuals and as the engine for
the continuation of the human family as a whole. Or, to put
it another way, marriage, at least in the Western religious
traditions, is such a powerful idea that its human dimension
is understood to be of a piece with central ideas about the
divine-human encounter. Even those traditions that limit
marriage, such as Western Catholicism with its discipline of
priestly and consecrated celibacy, or eliminate it, as in the
Shaker movement, or reconceive it, as in nineteenth century
Mormonism’s embrace of earthly polygamy as a step to a
glorified family life after death, do so for the sake of the idea
of marriage itself, though shifting more sharply than other
traditions from the merely human to the spiritual plane. But
all this depends on the conviction, which need not be religious
at all, that marriage is something deep indeed.
C.
An argument of the sort I have just made understandably
invites two types of objections. The first is that marriage
the time of man’s innocency, signifying unto us the mystical union that
is betwixt Christ and his Church; which holy estate Christ adorned and
beautified with his presence, and first miracle that he wrought, in Cana
of Galilee; and is commended of Saint Paul to be honourable among all
men: and therefore is not by any to be enterprised, nor taken in hand,
unadvisedly, lightly, or wantonly, to satisfy men’s carnal lusts and
appetites, like brute beasts that have no understanding; but reverently,
discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God; duly considering the
causes for which Matrimony was ordained.
First, It was ordained for the procreation of children, to be brought up in
the fear and nurture of the Lord, and to the praise of his holy Name.
Secondly, It was ordained for a remedy against sin, and to avoid
fornication; that such persons as have not the gift of continency might
marry, and keep themselves undefiled members of Christ’s body.
Thirdly, It was ordained for the mutual society, help, and comfort, that
the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity. Into
which holy estate these two persons present come now to be joined.
Therefore if any man can show any just cause, why they may not lawfully
be joined together, let him now speak, or else hereafter for ever hold his
peace.

2014]

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

317

cannot be fundamentally an institution grounded in the
unique link between heterosexual sex and potential
procreation because, after all, our traditions about marriage
have historically allowed elderly and infertile heterosexual
couples to get married.64 Some opponents of same-sex
marriage have responded to this objection with quasimetaphysical arguments about male and female biological
complementarity.65 But there is a simpler response66: as
described here, the institution of marriage does not merely
facilitate heterosexual bonding; it also channels (more or less
strongly) psychological and cultural expectations about the
form that committed heterosexual sexual relations should
take.67 If the institution is doing its job, then heterosexual
couples and the society around them should take for granted
that the only, or at least highest, expression of their sexual
bond will take place in the context of marriage. It would
therefore be unrealistic and unworkable, and weaken the
psychological and cultural power of marriage, to cut off those
expectations for particular couples just because they happen
to discover themselves unable to have children.68
64. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Argument
Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. THOMAS L.J. 5, 24 (2004); cf. Goodridge v. Dep’t
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“Our laws of civil marriage do
not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married people above
every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of creating a family.
General Laws c. 207 contains no requirement that the applicants for a marriage
license attest to their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility
is not a condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. People who have never
consummated their marriage, and never plan to, may be and stay married. People
who cannot stir from their deathbed may marry.”) (citation omitted) (footnote
omitted).
65. See George & Bradley, supra note 40, at 301-02; see, e.g., John M. Finnis,
Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1068
(1994).
66. I make much the same point in Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9, at
1177.
67. Cf. Holy Secular Instituiton, supra note 9, at 1177 & nn.152-53 (discussing
channeling function of the institution and definition of marriage, and citing
sources).
68. Cf. Teresa Stanton Collett, Constitutional Confusion: The Case for the
Minnesota Marriage Amendment, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1029, 1049 (2007) (“It
is true that that the state recognizes marriages between elderly or infertile
couples unable to conceive, or younger couples intending to avoid conception
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The second general objection to the sort of argument
made here is that it is myopic and essentialist. It ignores the
wide variety of forms that marriage has taken and the many
ways in which our understanding of marriage has changed.69
Marriage can be monogamous or polygamous, patriarchal or
egalitarian, economic or companionate, exogamous or
endogamous, and so on. And, similarly, the objection goes,
marriage can be rigidly heterosexual or open to other
possibilities.
This objection has two related problems. First, to say that
marriage has taken many different forms in various times
and places does not prove that it has no essential core. In fact,
the argument for that essential core is actually strengthened
by the jumble of more variable and less essential features.
And the fact remains that the heterosexual paradigm has
been consistent across time and space.70 Thus, it is telling
that Lord Stowell and his contemporaries, in describing
marriage as a contract of natural law, did not focus on
patriarchy, property, or any other specific feature of marriage

through the use of contraception. But these arguments ignore the importance of
the modeling to be achieved by encouraging all heterosexual couples to marry, as
well as the legitimate self-imposed privacy limits a state may observe in its
regulation of the matter.”).
It is a separate question, of course, whether extending the institution of marriage
to non-heterosexual couples would dilute the psychological and cultural force of
the institution. I return to that argument later. See infra notes 175-178 and
accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 966-67 (“As a public institution and a
right of fundamental importance, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm.”);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 26 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (“The
claim that marriage has always had a single and unalterable meaning is a plain
distortion of history. In truth, the common understanding of ‘marriage’ has
changed dramatically over the centuries.”); Brief of the Professors of the History
of Marriage, Families, and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 30, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. A-2244-03T5),
2005 N.J. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 322, at *36; JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY
IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 60-64 (2004).
70. See DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 91-125, 154 (2007).
But cf. David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-ongay-marriage-changed.html?pagewanted=print.
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law, but only on the assumption that marriage exists
“between two individuals of different sexes.”71
Second, this sort of nominalist objection, if taken to its
own logical conclusion, is self-defeating. Proponents of samesex marriage are just as essentialist as opponents; 72
otherwise, they would allow any relationship whatsoever to
form a marriage. That they would not is obvious whenever
they take offense at opponents’ typical slippery slope
arguments.73 In other words, we are back to the “line-drawing
problem” I emphasized earlier.74 Defenders of same-sex
71. See Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B.) 669; 2 Hag.
Con. 54, 63.
72. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and
the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1997) (“The claim that there is
no essence of marriage . . . is a claim about the essence of marriage. Since there
is discourse about ‘marriage,’ anti-essentialists need to explain what is ‘really’
going on behind the appearance of ‘marriage.’ Once they do, they are talking about
what is or is not essential. We are all, therefore, ‘essentialists.’ The real debate is
about the nature and content of specific ‘essences,’ and the relationship of those
essences to contingent social forms.”).
73. See, e.g., Isaac Davison, Gay Marriage Rejectors ‘In Denial,’ NEW ZEALAND
HERALD (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=
1&objectid=10845849 (“The sponsor of a bill to legalise same-sex weddings says
marriage is an evolving institution and many opponents of a law change were in
denial about the fact that homosexuals had held equal rights in New Zealand for
27 years. . . . The MP dismissed as insulting the argument that passing same-sex
marriage was a ‘slippery slope’ to polygamy, bigamy, bestiality and incest, which
remained criminal offences.”); David Edwards, Santorum Gets Booed After
Claiming Same Sex Marriage Justifies Polygamy, THE RAW STORY (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/01/05/santorum-gets-booed-after-claimingsame-sex-marriage-justifies-polygamy/.
74. Consider, for example, this entirely un-ironic defense of same-sex marriage
against the argument that it will lead to the possibility of legally-recognized
polygamy:
Our first task is to erect the boundary between same-sex marriage and
polygamy. The essential difference—one that is fundamental to the
marriage forms, and not merely correlative—is that marriage, same-sex
or otherwise, is today predicated on romantic love. In contrast, polygamy
is expressly admitted to exclude the expectation of romantic love: it is
grounded on other experiences, and intended to fulfill other personal,
social, and religious needs (duty, for one).
James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage is
Not a Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 557 (2002)
(emphasis added); see also Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or
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marriage might want to draw that line in a different place
than opponents, but they do want, and need, to draw the line
or else their own arguments dissolve away. Why should
marriage have anything to do with sex or love, whether
heterosexual or homosexual? Why should it be marked off
from familial bonds or simple friendship? If there is no core
to the institution of marriage at all, then there is no meaning
to the institution and no standard against which to evaluate
the exclusion of same-sex couples from that institution.
D.
I have in this Part expanded on Lord Stowell’s
assumption that heterosexual marriage might be an
institution in the law of nature. This is not a “proof.” But I
have tried to explain and at least mildly defend the
plausibility of the idea. Some readers will have no interest in,
or patience with, natural law discourse at all, even in the very
general and minimally metaphysical form that I have
presented it.75 For them, I have suggested that it might be
helpful to consider instead the thinner proposition that
treating heterosexual marriage as the paradigm of the
institution of marriage is normatively rational. Those
readers could, if they insist, skip ahead to Part III of this
Article. Other readers will accept the idea of natural law, but
disagree that it says anything about heterosexual marriage.
Yet others will object to any effort to ground marriage or even
say anything nice about it, quite apart from the question of
same-sex marriage. These are all—whether or not I agree
with them—respectable views.
My main goal in both Parts II and III of this Article,
however, is to address the assumption that only a thinner or
more strictly positivistic description of marriage—a
description that rejects either the natural basis of marriage
or the idea that the paradigm of marriage is essentially
heterosexual—could accommodate same-sex marriage. It is
to that puzzle, of how same-sex marriage might fit into an
Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501,
1615 (1997).
75. As I emphasized earlier, see supra note 34 and accompanying text, my own
commitment to natural law jurisprudence is at least lukewarm.
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account of marriage as paradigmatically heterosexual, that I
now want to turn.
II. ENTER POSITIVE LAW
The first question at hand is what precisely follows from
the view that (heterosexual) marriage is an institution of
natural law. For some ancient Roman thinkers, natural law
reflected deeply-ingrained principles independent of enacted
and particular laws, but its actual normative force was weak
or unclear.76 Cicero and other Stoics, however, believed that
“true law is right reason in agreement with nature”77 and the
later medieval, Enlightenment, and modern versions of
natural law all come closer to embracing—with considerable
variety in jurisprudential details—something like the twofold definition of natural law with which I began: a form of
normative realism combined with a commitment to some sort
of hinge or hook between normative reality and positive law.
Thus, to say that marriage, and specifically heterosexual
marriage, is an institution of natural law would suggest, at
least, that legal systems aspiring to conform themselves to
something like natural law should incorporate an institution
of heterosexual marriage, much the same as they should
incorporate a whole range of other features of natural law
and natural right, including both interpersonal rights and
rights of liberty against the state. As noted above, that helps
explain the place of a “right to marry” in our constitutional
imagination. It might also suggest—along with other

76. TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 136-37.
77. Cicero, De Re Publica, in ON THE REPUBLIC, ON THE LAWS 211, bk. 3, § 22
(Clinton W. Keyes trans., Loeb Classical Library 1928). Stephen Buckle has
argued that “Despite disagreements about the content of natural law, the
standard formulations of the basic idea of natural law in medieval Europe were
of a piece with the Ciceronian.” Stephen Buckle, Natural Law, in A COMPANION
TO ETHICS 161, 165 (Peter Singer ed., 1993). For accounts that argue for more
substantial differences between even Cicero’s version of natural law and later
theories, see, for example, FRANCIS OAKLEY, NATURAL LAW, LAWS OF NATURE,
NATURAL RIGHTS: CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 22
(2005).
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considerations78—that marriage is more than a mere
licensing scheme and that the government could not simply
eliminate marriage as a legally recognized status and
institution without some constitutional cost.
But what does this imply about same-sex marriage? In
other words, if, at least for the sake of argument, the
paradigm of marriage in natural law is heterosexual, might
same-sex marriage still be in “agreement with nature?”
Yes. The complication here is precisely the introduction
of positive law into the picture. As I have emphasized
elsewhere,79 and as others have thought through in
considerably greater detail, few theories of natural law have
conceived of it as purely self-contained and self-executing. To
the contrary, the relation between natural law and positive
law is invariably difficult and complicated. Indeed, it is fair
to say that one of the most important challenges any account
of natural law must meet is to articulate a theory of positive
law and the relation of the two. And not surprisingly, it is
lawyers—whether the medieval canonists or eighteenth and
nineteenth century common law jurists—who have often had
a good deal to say about how positive law and natural law
coexist and interact.
Positive law can play a role in natural law jurisprudence
in several distinct ways.80 To begin with, some theorists have
argued that positive legal sanction is indispensable to giving
juridical force to natural law.81 More to the point, as Thomas
Aquinas most famously emphasized, positive law must at
least fill in many of the particular details—some involving
arbitrary choices such as which side of the road to drive on
and others reflecting more substantive values contingent on
78. See my discussion in Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9, at 1188, of the
possible constitutional implications of the existence of a religious dimension to
marriage.
79. See Dane, Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, supra note 34, at 14950.
80. Much of the discussion in this Part is drawn from my article, Dane, Natural
Law Challenge to Choice of Law, supra note 34.
81. See Jürgen Habermas, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 104-05 (William Rehg trans., 1996);
Jeremey Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1562 (1996).
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circumstances of time and place—about which natural law is
itself indifferent.82 This insight is particularly important in
understanding the puzzle of marriage, which otherwise
might seem to be an institution much too highly regulated
and specifically defined by positive law to qualify as an
institution of natural law. But as the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on marriage suggests, the institution can be
understood as combining a basic core understanding
constituting a moral or constitutional entitlement with a
panoply of varying and equally permissible regulatory
details.83 Or, as I put it in a different context, the institution
of marriage “has two faces. . . . [It] is . . . governed by very
precise, often technical, requirements and consequences [and
at] the same time . . . participates in a larger legal and
cultural project . . . . These two faces coexist. Neither face
should be reduced to the other, or deemed irrelevant.”84
Even more fundamentally, most theories of natural law
recognize potentially substantial authority for positive law
even when it trenches on questions about which natural law
is not “indifferent.” To some extent, this recognition simply
reflects a theory of roles: while legislators might be
normatively bound to try to adhere to natural law, judges in
their role as enforcers of law and individual citizens as the
objects of law are, according to many natural law accounts,
required in many or even all circumstances to respect
whatever determination the legislature makes.85 Thus,
natural law in this view does not sit perched “above positive
law like a constitution,” simply invalidating any contrary
positive law.86
82. See Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
211, 213 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010).

OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY

83. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 87 (1987).
84. Dane, Intersecting Worlds, supra note 22, at 405.
85. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Natural Law and Positive Law, in COMMON
TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 151, 165-66 (Edward B. McLean ed.,
2004). For a very different but complementary argument, see JEREMY WALDRON,
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
75-76 (1999).
86. Dane, Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, supra note 34, at 149.
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Nevertheless, the classical common law tradition
emphasized that, even as natural law made way for positive
law in the work of judges, it did not by any means exit the
stage. To the contrary, natural law arguments could do
important legal work. When the legislature has not spoken,
those arguments—in the classic common law conception of a
judge—can work directly on the law, at least as complicatedly
filtered through the “artificial reason of the law.”87 Even
when the legislature has spoken, they can provide rules of
construction. They can also create presumptions in favor of
strong geographical, temporal, or conceptual limits to
problematic positive law.
Lord Stowell’s decision in Dalrymple is itself a classic
example of this delicate interplay between positive law and
natural law. Recall that young Mr. Dalrymple entered into
his non-ceremonial marital relationship in Scotland. This
fact was crucial because, as noted earlier, an Act of
Parliament had abolished non-ceremonial marriages.88 The
statute did not, however, apply to the distinct Scottish legal
system, which left room for Lord Stowell’s account of natural
law to have its say.89 Meanwhile, in the United States, the
natural law analysis in Dalrymple was sometimes put to an
even more aggressive use, with some courts holding that even
when States enacted licensing and solemnization regimes
governing marriage, those statutes were merely “directory”
rather than “mandatory,” and non-ceremonial marriages
entered into by simple mutual consent could still be civilly
recognized.90 In the words of the leading nineteenth century
treatise on marriage:
Marriage existed before statutes, it is of natural right, it is favored
by the law. Hence, in reason, any commands which a statute may
give concerning its solemnization should, if the form of words will
87. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2
OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 175 (2002); Gerald J. Postema, Classical
Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 7
(2003).
88. See Marriage Act, 1753, 26 Geo. 2 c. 33.
89. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B.) 668; 2 Hag. Con.
54, 61-62.
90. See generally Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877).
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permit, be interpreted as mere directions to the officers of the law
and to the parties, not rendering void what is done in disregard
thereof.91

The more famous example of the interplay of natural law
and positive law involved the terrible problem of slavery.
According to one standard view, slavery, being contrary to
natural law, could only be supported by municipal law and
then only within the geographical bounds of that municipal
law.92 For our purposes, the most interesting test of this
principle involved the intersection of the question of slavery
and the law of marriage after slavery was abolished: in the
antebellum slave states, slaves could not generally enter into
civilly-recognized marriages.93 Nevertheless, of course, many
slave couples did “marry” according to their own
understanding and with their own rituals.94 After the Civil
War and the abolition of slavery, the question arose whether
those marriages would be retroactively recognized.95 (The
question of timing was often important in resolving disputes
regarding property, the validity of subsequent marriages,
and the like). While the response in Southern legal systems
was split, at least some States, either by court opinion or with
91. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 241, § 283 (6th ed. 1881). The passage continues: “Consequently the
doctrine has become established in authority, that a marriage good at the common
law is good notwithstanding the existence of any statute on the subject, unless the
statute contains express words of nullity.” Id.
92. See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
93. See, e.g., Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 235, 236 (N.C. 1858) (“[T]he
relation of ‘man and wife’ cannot exist among slaves. It is excluded, both on
account of their incapacity to contract, and of the paramount right of ownership
in them, as property.”); Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the
United States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 307 (2006) (“During the period of
American Slavery, blacks were denied even the most basic of human rights,
including the right to join together as a legally sanctioned family unit. As
personalty, slaves lacked the capacity to enter into any form of marital union
recognized necessarily or legally by the plantation masters, the government, or
the judiciary.”) (footnotes omitted).
94. See JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 149-91 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1979); Thomas E. Will, Weddings
on Contested Grounds: Slave Marriage in the Antebellum South, 62 HISTORIAN 99
(1999).
95. See generally Goring, supra note 93, at 314-15.
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the help of saving statutes, did hold that the earlier “natural”
marriages, although rendered invisible by the law of slavery,
came back into sight, so to speak, when the oppressive force
of that law was removed.96 To be sure, this answer was
controversial, and some contrary authorities made the notunreasonable argument that, in a world of positive law,
natural marriage, even under these circumstances, had to
give way to other powerful principles, including the need for
certain and settled expectations, the rights of other parties,
and the practical difficulties of proof.97 For my present
purposes, however, the important thing is not which side
made the stronger case, but that the argument was even
possible.98
Thus, even if natural law does not stand perched “above
positive law like a constitution,” it does rest firmly “below it
like a substrate, not as the limit to positive law, but as its
foundation.”99 Natural law and positive law in this view are
mutually interstitial. The details of positive law fill in the
gaps in natural law, but natural law also fills in the gaps,
ambiguities, and jurisdictional details of positive law.
But there are yet more powerful ways in which natural
law might, according to its own principles, recognize the force
of positive law—what Jeremy Waldron has called the
“dignity of legislation.”100 I have elsewhere argued, for
example, that even a jurisdiction committed to the view that
its own laws perfectly reflect a universal natural law could
still respect legal diversity and embrace a robust,
multilateralist law of choice of law.101 Here though, I want to
96. See, e.g., Stikes v. Swanson, 44 Ala. 633, 635 (1870) (relying on common
law), overruled by Cantelan v. Doe ex dem. Hood, 56 Ala. 519 (Ala. 1876); State v.
Harris, 63 N.C. 1, 4 (N.C. 1868) (citing statute).
97. See, e.g., Cantelou v. Doe ex dem. Hood, 56 Ala. 519, 519-20 (Ala. 1876).
98. Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which had in
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) been the first to
recognize a state constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry, subsequently
refused in Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946 (Mass. 2008) to grant marital
rights retroactively even to couples who might be able to demonstrate that they
would have been married but for the earlier, now-voided, legal prohibition.
99. Dane, Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, supra note 34, at 171.
100. See WALDRON, supra note 85, at 156.
101. See Dane, Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, supra note 34.
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emphasize a somewhat different point: the very existence of
positive law and formal legal institutions with their powers
of specification, coordination, and enforcement, can alter the
normative world. It can change the assumptions against
which natural law would otherwise operate. Thus,
lawmakers can—over and above the prerogatives of their
merely positive authority—legitimately invoke principles,
priorities, and practical realities to produce results that are
in tension with the natural law that might otherwise prevail
in the absence of an actual organized legal system.
Recognition of this sort of complex interplay between
natural law and positive law goes back at least to the roots of
the Christian West’s rediscovery and reframing of natural
law thinking.102 For example:
[M]any medieval and early modern thinkers argued that there was
no natural right to private property—that, to the contrary, every
person had a natural right of access to the world’s goods, either . . .
equally or for . . . subsistence. Nevertheless . . . [they] recognized
that legitimate legal systems could reconstitute this natural
entitlement, and promote what we would call efficiency or wealth
maximization or social coordination, by allocating specific property
to specific individuals as a matter of conventional positive law. 103

Significantly though, even in this view, natural law
continued to do analytic work even when its most direct
vision of an unhindered natural right of access was put to the
side. It helped, for example, motivate a notion of “necessity”
that limited the entitlement of the positive property regime.
More to the point, perhaps, the very idea of a “natural” right
to property arose out of a practical legal dilemma facing
medieval canonists: the question at hand—put most strongly
by opponents of these new and threatening religious
movements—was how Franciscans could take a vow of
poverty and renounce their right to hold property, while still,
in effect, claiming use rights to the goods they received in
their itinerant begging. The answer was that the Franciscan
vow of poverty extended only to any rights they might have
102. See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, LIBERTY
NATURAL LAW, 1100-1800 (2014).
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103. Dane, Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, supra note 34, at 168-69.
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in positive property but did not—indeed, could not—deprive
them of their natural right to subsistence.
“Centuries later, John Locke, while not rejecting a right
to subsistence, also argued that private property of at least a
sort did exist as a matter of natural law.”104 But “a sound
reading of Locke is that legitimately constituted legal
systems are not only empowered to enforce those natural
rights as some libertarians believe, but also to regulate and
even reallocate property for social ends.”105
Thus, “[w]hatever the starting point”—whatever the
precise balance between private and collective ownership in
the law of nature considered in isolation—“the introduction
of positive law into the picture is transformative.”106
104. Id. at 169.
105. Id.
106. Id.
A more obscure but deeply evocative example of this sort of complex interaction
between “natural law” and positive law is found in the history of the law of
copyright. See generally Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship: Allocating
Entitlements in the Copyright System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 413 (2009); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365 (2000). The first English copyright law was the
“stationers’ copyright,” a product of the system of licensing and monopoly that
gave the London publishing guild—the Stationers’ Company—control over the
production of books. See Patterson, supra, at 366. In 1709, however, Parliament
created the first statutory copyright system with the Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Ann.,
c. 19. The Statute of Anne upended the old monopoly system in two distinct ways.
First, it vested the copyright in the author, relegating the publisher to the role of
assignee. Id. Second, it limited what had been a perpetual right to a term of
“fourteen years, to commence from the day of the first publishing the same, and
no longer.” Id. The statute, however, left an obvious gap: who owned the rights to
a work before its first publication? In 1769, Lord Mansfield writing for the King’s
Bench held that authors possessed under the common law a “natural law” right
to publish and control their own work and that this right not only preceded the
first publication but extended into perpetuity, thus effectively overriding the
limited term specified in the Statute of Anne. See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng.
Rep. 201 (K.B.) 251; 4 Burr. 2303, 2396-97. (This was actually less a victory for
authors than for the old monopolist booksellers, since they could “simply demand
the assignment of the [natural law] copyright as a condition for publishing the
work.” See Patterson, supra, at 381 n.37). Only five years later, however, the
House of Lords solved the puzzle in a strikingly different way. Donaldson v.
Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 839-40, 846-47; 2 Brown 129, 134-35, 14445. It recognized the author’s “natural law” ownership of his work prior to first
publication, but that any rights after that were governed solely by the Statute of
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This analysis suggests that Lord Stowell might actually
have overplayed his hand in Dalrymple. In fact, the
resistance to non-ceremonial marriage which he might have
found not only in English statute law but also in both
Protestant Reformation thinking about the state’s role in
marriage and Catholic canon law in the wake of the Council
of Trent, reflected a serious concern that marriage as a legal
and social institution embedded in a larger matrix of both
legal entitlements and collective purposes required some
public acknowledgment and participation and that
clandestine or purely private marriages were, at least
arguably, a contradiction in terms. Lord Stowell powerfully
Anne. Id. The effect of this elegant analysis was that the “natural law” filled in
the gap left by the statute (as to who owned rights to a work before its first
publication), but that the positive law could and did extinguish that natural law
right in the service of larger social ends, including “the encouragement of
learning, the protection of the public domain, and public access by publication.”
Patterson, supra, at 382. In the United States, until 1978, federal statutory
copyright was triggered by publication, while state common law covered prepublication rights. See Werckmeister v. Am. Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324-25
(2d Cir. 1904); Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 77-78 (Cal.
1950); cf. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (rejecting common law or
natural law grounds for federal copyright and holding that copyright in federal
law is entirely statutory). The Copyright Act of 1976, however, radically reshaped
the law by shifting the line between federal and state rights from the moment of
publication to “fix[ation] in any tangible medium of expression.” See 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (2012); Laura A Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation
and the Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 842-44 (2009).
In any event, some commentators continue to argue that the “separation of
authors’ rights from the narrow right of publishers to publish manuscripts is an
important separation between natural and economic rights that ought to be
acknowledged as creating two distinct sets of rights - property entitlements and
economic privileges - in copyright jurisprudence.” Ng, supra, at 447-48; see also
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517,558-59 (1990). And European civil law, in contrast to the AngloAmerican tradition, famously recognizes authors’ “moral rights” over their work
in addition to their rights under copyright law. See Jeff Berg, Moral Rights: A
Legal Historical and Anthropological Reappraisal, 6 INTELL. PROP. J. 341 (1991);
Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1 (1997); Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and
Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465 (1968). Lurking in all these
debates is a more basic question: whether the story we tell about intellectual
property is of a piece with, or only superficially resembles, the interplay between
“natural” entitlements and positive regulation in the story of property writ large.
See generally Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is
Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993); Yen, supra.
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recognized the integrity of natural law—the law that would
apply even if “no third person existed in the world.” And he
emphasized that the force of natural law persisted even when
marriage “becomes a civil contract regulated and prescribed
by law and endowed with civil consequences.” He then
reasoned on the basis of natural law that the default state of
Scots law, in the absence of a regulation to the contrary, was
to recognize nonceremonial marriages. But he might not have
sufficiently appreciated the extent to which, in a world full of
“third persons” organized into effective legal systems, the
relation between the natural law of marriage and its positive
regulation is not merely additive, so to speak, but potentially
interactive.
What does all this have to say about same-sex marriage?
Only that it is perfectly possible to believe that marriage is
an institution of natural law and that marriage is by “nature”
heterosexual but also to see all this as the beginning of the
conversation about the precise shape of marriage, not as its
end. This might seem like a small conclusion. But it is
actually sufficiently important, especially in light of the
assumption to the contrary of both defenders and opponents
of same-sex marriage that it is worth pausing at precisely
this conclusion before proceeding to the next Part of this
paper.
III. PARADIGMS AND EXTENSIONS: OF ANALOGY OF DIGNITY
A.
I observed at the start of this paper that proponents of
same-sex marriage have felt the need to “thin” the conception
of marriage in two ways: by rejecting its natural or essential
character and by denying its paradigmatically heterosexual
meaning. Part II addressed both points together.
Emphasizing the dynamic, interactive, and mutually
interstitial relation between natural law and positive law, it
reached the admittedly negative but still important
conclusion that accepting a “naturally” heterosexual account
of marriage does not exclude normative arguments for samesex marriage in actual societies with developed systems of
positive law. This Part sketches the form that such normative
arguments might take. In one sense, the argument here
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follows from Parts I and II. But it can also be read apart from
them and their excursion into natural law discourse simply
by focusing directly, without the equipment of natural law
discourse, on the claim that the historical, purposive, and
analytical paradigm of marriage has been and remains
heterosexual.
It is easy to see how many of the prevalent arguments for
same-sex marriage necessarily reject the paradigmatically
heterosexual character of marriage. For example, the effort
to rest same-sex marriage on a more general “right to marry”
only follows unproblematically if we deny from the outset
that marriage is paradigmatically heterosexual. More to the
point, the arguments over “marriage equality” typically
depend on a specific two-step maneuver that has
characterized much of our means-end constitutional equal
protection discourse since at least Joseph Tussman and
Jacobus tenBroek’s classic formulation of the subject in
1949.107 The first step (analytically, not necessarily in
exposition) is to define the essential character of marriage.
The second step is to ask whether, given that definition, it is
“irrational” or invidious for the law to exclude same-sex
couples from the possibility of marriage. This form of
argument, however, only supports a right to same-sex
marriage if the ends, purposes, or meaning of “marriage” are
stripped of much of their once taken-for-granted substantive
thickness, and in particular stripped of any defining
reference to reproductive sexual bonding or the uniquely
procreative potential of heterosexual sex.108 The argument for
“marriage equality” thus depends on rejecting the idea that
the paradigm of marriage is heterosexual and that this
paradigm reasonably reflects the normative origins and
underpinnings of the institution.
The question then is whether there is any way to extend
marriage to same-sex couples without rejecting the
heterosexual paradigm of marriage. In fact, there is. We do
often extend existing rights or institutions to new cases by
engaging in the sort of two-step maneuver I just described:
abstracting away from the existing particular and then
107. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
108. See supra note 17.
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applying that abstraction to a new set of particulars. Indeed,
legal and moral reasoning more generally often moves
vertically, so to speak, ascending from existing cases to an
abstract height and then descending to the new case.
But not always.109 Sometimes, legal and moral reasoning
moves horizontally, asking only whether a new case or
application can be justified at the boundaries of the old. The
vertical maneuver is necessarily acidic—destructive of the
paradigm undergirding the existing case. The horizontal
maneuver, by contrast is, as a logical form, agnostic and
open-ended, though it can end up challenging existing
assumptions and inviting new questions.
What I am calling “horizontal” extensions of existing
legal and moral paradigms show up in many contexts.110 I
109. My argument here bears at least a distant family resemblance to that in
LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 11522 (2005). Specifically, Weinreb finds unsatisfactory the view that analogical
reasoning in legal argument necessarily requires finding a “rule” that covers both
an existing case and its analogically-derived extension. Id. Weinreb argues, to the
contrary, that analogies can proceed directly from the existing case to the
extension without the need for a general “analogy-warranting rule.” Id.; see also
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746-47 (1993)
(emphasizing that analogical reasoning “focuses on particulars . . . develops from
concrete controversies . . . [and] operates without a comprehensive theory that
accounts for the particular outcomes it yields”).
110. Recall in this connection the discussion of copyright law at supra note 106.
Another example, from private law, is the doctrine of “quasi-contract.” According
to the seminal nineteenth century case, quasi-contracts or contracts implied in
law are found “whenever . . . the common sense and common justice of the country,
and therefore the common law or statute law, impose upon any one a duty,
irrespective of contract, and allow it to be enforced by a contract remedy.” Hertzog
v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 467 (Pa. 1857). As one typical contemporary case puts it:
Even if there is no express contract, a plaintiff may sometimes recover
under the theory of unjust enrichment, which is also called quantum
meruit, contract implied-in-law, constructive contract, or quasi contract.
These theories are legal fictions invented by the common law courts in
order to permit recovery where in fact there is no true contract, but
where, to avoid unjust enrichment, the courts permit recovery of the
value of the services rendered just as if there had been a true contract.
Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotations
omitted).
Whatever the precise formulation, the affinity to what I am calling “horizontal”
extension of a paradigm is obvious. As I emphasize in the discussion below of what
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I call “analogy of dignity,” however, such “horizontal” extensions are rarely
straightforward.
Thus, at one extreme, many commentators would prefer to eliminate the
terminology of quasi-contracts or contracts implied in law and instead just rest
the obligations involved on notions of unjust enrichment or restitution. See, e.g.,
PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 19-22 (1989); cf. J.H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 195 (3d ed. 1971) (arguing
that in early English cases, “[t]his type of remedy was given the name quasicontract, a misleading anglicisation of the Roman obligation quasi ex contractu”).
Others are slightly more understanding but still ultimately dismissive. See, e.g.,
Stephen A. Smith, Justifying the Law of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2177,
2182 (2001) (“The terminology of ‘quasi-contract’ and ‘implied contract’ that was
once used to describe actions in unjust enrichment can be explained in part as an
attempt to give a justification for the duty to return. Although the fiction of ‘quasicontract’ has now rightly been abandoned, we should not be surprised that it was
used, and for so long. It offered a plausible normative explanation of the
defendant’s apparent duty to benefit the plaintiff.”). Yet others tolerate the label,
as long as it is understood as a mere legal fiction. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 640-43, 646-49 (4th ed.
2010).
At the other extreme, though, some commentators argue that notions such as
quasi-contract challenge the very basis of the idea that contract law itself is
grounded in will or consent. As Clare Dalton has put it:
The current mainstream treatment of quasi-contracts and implied
contracts illustrates doctrine’s techniques of separation and conflation.
The prevailing position, represented by the Second Restatement, but also
by cases and commentary from the 1850’s to the present, is that quasicontracts are not contracts at all, but constitute instead an exceptional
imposition of obligation by the state in order to prevent unjust
enrichment. An artificially sharp line of demarcation is therefore
presented as separating quasi-contracts from implied-in-fact contracts,
and public from private. But this position obscures the fact that the
finding of contractual implication is guided in the so-called “private”
sphere by the same considerations that dictate the imposition of quasicontract. Any inquiry into a party’s intent must confront the problem of
knowledge—our ultimate inability to gain access to the subjective intent
underlying any particular agreement.
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1011 (1985). And Patrick Atiyah famously argued that quasi-contracts were
historically not a matter of what I am calling “horizontal” extension of a paradigm
at all, but were rather ripped out of the body of a more capacious account of
contract law when judges began to articulate a more determinedly consent-based
theory of contract in the nineteenth century. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 184 (1979) (“the conceptual distinctions between contract
and quasi-contract . . . did not really exist” in Lord Mansfield’s time); see also, e.g.,
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 170-71
(1979); James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract
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want to focus, however, on one subset of that larger
phenomenon, which I call “analogy of dignity,” in which the
case for extending a paradigm rests at least in part on some
claim about the status or worth of the person or entity for
whose benefit the paradigm rule or institution is being
extended. Arguments for analogy of dignity thus have
something to do with notions of equal worth, but they differ
substantially from the usual means-end rhetoric typically
identified with constitutional “equal protection” doctrine.111
Arguments for what I call “analogy of dignity” vary in
their details and their consequences. But they all share
certain basic characteristics.
First, these arguments do not reject the sheer coherence
or sufficiency of limiting a given right or institution to its
paradigm case. They do not claim that doing so would simply
be irrational. Instead, they rely on distinct normative (or
Theory: The View from Lord Mansfield’s Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1968-69
(1988) (“Just as the promise was, for Mansfield, a moral statement, so also was
the return of unjust enrichment a moral necessity. In this sense, contract and
quasi-contract were congenial parts of an overall philosophy of moral
transactional behavior that required the honoring of legitimately created
expectations and the return of benefits unjustly acquired.”). But see J.H. Baker,
Reviews, 43 MOD. L. REV. 467, 467-69 (1980) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979)).
I have discussed all this at such length here only to hammer home the point that
the sort of conceptual and normative ambiguities, fluidities, and challenges we
find in the debate over same-sex marriage, or for that matter any of the other
examples of what I am calling “analogy of dignity,” are in a deep sense not all that
extraordinary.
111. I am indebted here to the compelling demonstration in Deborah Hellman,
Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
315, 343 (1998) that not all equal protection cases fall into the standard
conception of “wrongful discrimination as ill-fit between proxy and target,”
although my alternative form of argument is not the same as hers and might not
even be an equal protection argument in the constitutional sense.
For other critiques of the adequacy of the standard Tussman and tenBroek model,
see, for example, Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 78 WASH. L. REV. 367, 368-70 (2003); Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); V.F.
Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal
Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 994-95 (2009). For a more general discussion of the
principles underlying legally-protected equality, see Denise Réaume, Dignity,
Equality, and Comparison, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION
LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds., 2014).
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normative plus prudential) arguments for extending the
right or institution to the new case even in the face of the
coherence of the paradigm case.
Second, even if the right or institution is extended to the
new case, the paradigm case remains the template for the
right or institution. That is to say, the way the right or
institution is understood, even in the new case, draws heavily
on the assumptions behind the paradigm case.
Third, the force of the argument from analogy will,
depending on the context, either end up being so taken for
granted as to render any distinction between the paradigm
case and its extension almost invisible, or it will continue to
be noticed and even marked by either substantive differences
or just terminological distinctions between the paradigm case
and its extension.
Fourth, in any event, applying the original template to
the new case is rarely entirely straightforward. Stubborn
factual differences between the paradigm case and the new
case can complicate matters and raise difficult puzzles. The
seams can show. How much they show, though, can vary
tremendously from one context to another.
Fifth, the very ground of the argument from analogy of
dignity can remain deeply contested even among those who
accept its results. Some participants in the debate might well
reject the coherence of the paradigm or refuse to treat it as
an appropriate template. Others might argue that the very
act of extending the right or institution to the new case will
inevitably, for good or ill, transform the right or institution
and its understanding. But—importantly—the extension of
the right or institution can occur even in the face of these
disputes, and the disputes can continue even after the
extension has occurred.
Sixth, the new dispensation will not necessarily be
stable. As with other arguments from analogy, it will leave
itself open to the claim that the circle should be drawn wider
still. But it will also be able, at least in many cases, to resist
those arguments precisely by keeping in mind both the
original paradigm and the precise reasons for moving beyond
it.
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B.
The best way to explain what I have in mind is by
example. I want to briefly suggest three areas in which
arguments from what I call analogy of dignity have been
made. Each of these topics would merit a law review article
to itself. But my point here is simply to suggest, with the
broadest brush strokes, how such arguments can proceed.
These three sets of instances are intentionally quite different
from each other, especially in where they sit on the spectrum
of possibilities in the six characteristics I have just outlined.
Together, though, they should get across the form of
argument I want to describe.
1.
Consider, first, the system of American federalism. Much
of American federalism, particularly its various guarantees
of state prerogatives112 and its assumptions about the
differences between States and other subnational units such
as cities,113 is based on the image of the States as a group of
sovereigns that, in banding together, gave up some but not
all of their sovereignty.114 But of the fifty States of the Union,
112. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997).
113. See, e.g., Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978).
114. This general narrative is powerfully present, in the negative, even in
contexts such as the federal foreign affairs power in which it is denied; the story
there is that, unlike internal sovereignty, which passed from the British Crown
to the States and was then delegated in part to the federal government, external
sovereignty passed directly from the Crown to the federal government at the
moment of independence. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936) (With respect to internal affairs, “the primary purpose
of the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then
possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the
federal government, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the
states. . . . [But] since the states severally never possessed international powers,
such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers, but
obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source. During
the colonial period, those powers were possessed exclusively by, and were entirely
under the control of, the Crown. By the Declaration of Independence, ‘the
Representatives of the United States of America’ declared the United (not the
several) Colonies to be free and independent states, and, as such, to have ‘full
Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and
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only the original thirteen and Texas,115 and arguably a few
others,116 were actually independent and in any sense
“sovereign” before joining the Union. The others were carved
out of territories; in those cases, if any actual delegation
occurred, it was from the federal government to the new
States and not the other way around. Nevertheless, all the
States are assimilated into the original paradigm. By virtue
of the “equal footing” doctrine117 and deeper, usually implicit,
principles, they are treated as if they reserved sovereign
powers that they, in fact, never had.
1. The assimilation of all the States into a paradigm
that, strictly speaking, only applies to about a quarter of
them, was not inevitable, and a different regime would not
to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.’ As a
result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the
powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies
severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the
United States of America.”) (citations omitted).
115. See Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and the Annexation of Texas, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 381, 384-87 (2006).
116. Vermont, for example, is often cited as, like Texas, a State that entered the
Union as an existing independent country. The case is debatable, however,
because, though in its own view independent before its entry into the Union in
1791, Vermont was, by some lights, nevertheless already within the territorial
boundaries of the United States. Id. at 393. Hawaii was undoubtedly an
independent country before its last monarch was overthrown, but it was a
territory for many years before gaining statehood. California claimed
independence from Mexico, but then became a territorial possession of the United
States before entering the Union.
117. See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 571-79 (1911) (notwithstanding
contrary condition in statute admitting Alabama to the Union, Congress could not
prevent Oklahoma from moving its state capital); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212,
221-23 (1845) (notwithstanding contrary language in the statute admitting
Alabama to the Union, the balance of federal and state control over navigable
waters must be the same in Alabama as in the original States).
Recent cases, particularly Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013)
(striking down the Voting Rights Act’s “pre-clearance” requirement for certain
States and portions of States), threaten to transform this limited “equal footing”
doctrine into a broader principle of “equal sovereignty among the states.” For
strong critiques of that move, see, for example, Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the
South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175 (2013); Vivek Kanwar, A Fugitive from the Camp
of the Conquerors: The Revival of the Equal Sovereignty Doctrine in Shelby County
v. Holder, J. RACE GENDER & ETHNICITY (forthcoming 2014).
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have been irrational. Many federal systems—Spain, the
United Kingdom, and Russia are among the often-cited
examples—are “asymmetric,” in that different subnational
units possess different degrees of autonomy and privilege,
depending on historical circumstances and other
considerations.118 Indeed, the Supreme Court has frankly
acknowledged the artificiality of its own narrative of
federalism, explaining in one Eleventh Amendment case, for
example, that “the States’ immunity from suit is a
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which
they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their
admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the
other States).”119 This is not to suggest that the equal footing
doctrine is wrong, but only that it is contingent, a
consequence of distinct normative decisions rather than
anything in the logic of statehood or federalism.
2. Implicit in that same, normatively defensible but
conceptually contingent, equal footing doctrine is that the
template for all the “new” States remains the narrative of the
original thirteen, pre-existing the Constitution and banding
118. See generally RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS (3d ed.
2008); Peter Pernthaler, Asymmetric Federalism as a Comprehensive Framework
of Regional Autonomy, in HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL COUNTRIES 2002, at 472 (Ann L.
Griffiths ed., Forum of Federations 2002 ed. 2002).
119. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); see also, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 574 (1964), in which the Court, in rejecting the argument that
unequal apportionments of state legislative districts were permissible by analogy
to the grossly unequal character of the United States Senate, wrote that the
“system of representation in the Two Houses of Federal Congress” arose from:
unique historical circumstances . . . based on the consideration that in
establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly independent
States bound themselves together under one national government.
Admittedly, the original 13 States surrendered some of their sovereignty
in agreeing to join together “to form a more perfect Union.” But at the
heart of our constitutional system remains the concept of separate and
distinct governmental entities which have delegated some, but not all, of
their formerly held powers to the single national government. The fact
that almost three-fourths of our present States were never in fact
independently sovereign does not detract from our view that the so-called
federal analogy is inapplicable as a sustaining precedent for state
legislative apportionments.
Id.
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together to surrender some but not all of their sovereignty to
a newly empowered federal government.
3. Moreover, the imaginative power of the equal footing
doctrine is so strong that the line between the original States
and the rest is virtually invisible, except in certain token
respects such as the design of the national flag, which
acknowledges the paradigm (in its thirteen stripes) even as
it proclaims its extension (in fifty stars).
4. Nevertheless, the seams show. Consider, for
example, the vast expanses of federal land in many of the
Western States—a consequence of their prior status as
territories and a crucial feature of the way federalism
actually operates in those States.120
5. Moreover, the whole project of expanding the United
States by simple analogy to the original union of thirteen
States has been, and continues to be in different respects,
contested. Much of what is today taken for granted was not
always so. The ability of the nation to acquire new territory,
as through the Louisiana Purchase, was at one time, for
example, a matter of live, vigorous debate.121 So was the
power of Congress to create new States in whatever
territories were acquired after the ratification of the
Constitution.122 So was the precise extent to which the
Constitution applied in the territories or in various
categories of territories.123

120. See R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE
SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1993); Bartholomew H.
Sparrow, Empires External and Internal: Territories, Government Lands, and
Federalism in the United States, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN
EXPANSION, 1803-1898, at 231, 238 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew Sparrow
eds., 2005) (“The result of these various regimes obtaining among U.S.
government agencies over the lands under their management is that state
boundaries—at least as marked on maps and as typically conceived—are
misleading and, in many instances, practically a fiction.”).
121. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First “Incorporation” Debate, in THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803-1898, supra note 120, at 19,
32-36.
122. See Maltz, supra note 115, at 384-85.
123. See generally Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion
and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005); Christina Duffy
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Today, although many of those earlier debates seem
settled, the consequences of the growth of the federal system
through assimilation into the original paradigm of thirteen
States remain controversial. Constitutional theorists debate,
for example, whether the language of sovereignty really
works in thinking about the purposes and character of
American federalism.124 And particular elements of the
constitutional design mean something very different than
they did when the country only had thirteen States.125 For
example, the population ratio of the largest to the smallest of
the original thirteen States was approximately eleven to one;
the same ratio today is closer to seventy to one, rendering the
anti-democratic consequences of the compromise that created
a Senate with equal representation for each State that much
more severe.126
6. And other questions and debates remain, injecting an
element of instability into our otherwise almost invisible
system of analogy of dignity. In some respects, after all, the
United States does have a system of asymmetric federalism,
in that some subnational units—the District of Columbia,
American Indian tribal governments, and our continuing
territorial possessions and associated commonwealths—are
treated very differently from the fifty states.127 And precisely
because our constitutional ideology only reluctantly
Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009).
124. For one useful review and provocative argument, see Heather K. Gerken,
The Supreme Court 2009 Term: Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010). The same concern has obviously figured in popular
commentary. See, e.g., James Poulos, Disunited and Without States: Americans
No Longer Take States Seriously as Political Units. And that Means Federalism
is
Probably
Doomed,
THE
DAILY
BEAST,
(Jan.
4,
2014),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/04/disunited-and-withoutstates.html.
125. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and
the Economics of American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2011).
126. For biting criticisms of these and other mismatches between the original
constitutional design and contemporary realities, see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW
WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 50-51 (2006).
127. See G. Alan Tarr, Symmetry and Asymmetry in American Federalism, in
THE FEDERAL IDEA: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD L. WATTS 169, 169 (Thomas J.
Courchene et al. eds., 2011).
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acknowledges the differences between the original thirteen
and the rest of the States, it becomes especially vulnerable to
the argument that it invidiously disadvantages those
subnational units that remain outside the circle. But the
country survives this discrepancy, and the resulting
instability turns out to be slight.
2.
Another context in which explicit or implicit arguments
for analogy of dignity have powerful consequences is in our
treatment of religion. American law and policy exhibit a
powerful, if often only intermittent, impulse to avoid treating
religious groups and traditions differently based on
theological differences among them, even when it might be
perfectly sensible to do so. The impulse, in other words, is to
extend religious rights and privileges beyond their paradigm
cases, even when the logic of the paradigms themselves
might not demand it. I have elsewhere discussed how this
impulse plays itself out profoundly in the American law of
charities, which is inclined (rightly, in my view) to treat all
religious groups the same, even in the face of what might be
defensible distinctions among them, and even at some cost to
the coherence of the law of charities itself.128 For present
purposes, though, I want to consider three narrower but
particularly acute instances of this important normative
impulse at work.
The first is quite trivial, but so deeply emblematic and
even absurd (in the comedic sense) that it merits some
discussion: New York City famously restricts parking on
certain sides of certain streets on certain days to allow street
cleaning vehicles to pass through unimpeded. As a result,
New Yorkers who park on city streets have grown
accustomed to getting up early on certain days to move their
cars to other parking spots across the street or around the
block. Many years ago, the City began suspending those
regulations on certain Jewish holidays when observant Jews
128. See Perry Dane, The Public, the Private, and the Sacred: Variations on a
Theme of Nomos and Narrative, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 15, 29-32
(1996).
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could not, for religious reasons, operate their vehicles.129 Over
time, though, the list of days on which the regulations are
suspended has grown to include the major holy days of a
panoply of faiths, even though most believers of most of those
faiths have no religious reasons not to drive on those days.130
In a deep sense, many religious communities in New York
City have come to see the suspension of alternate-side
parking on their holy days, not as an accommodation of their
specific religious needs, but as a sort of coming of age within
the city’s pluralistic mosaic.131

129. Originally, alternate side of the street restrictions were only suspended on
certain civil holidays (including Christmas) and on Good Friday, presumably for
the benefit of the sanitation workers. At least by 1960, however, the suspension
also applied on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, the Jewish High Holy Days.
Wiley Clarifies No-Parking Rules: 11 Legal, Three Religious Holidays Listed on
Which Bans Will Be Eased, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1960, at 49. In 1968, Mayor John
Lindsay tried to cut back on suspensions, limiting them to civil holidays and
Christmas, but soon relented after a storm of protests, immediately restoring
Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur to the list and directing a review of whether
other religious holidays, including Good Friday and Passover, should be included.
Mayor Eases His Stand on Parking for Holy Days, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1968, at
49. In 1970, the New York City Council legislated on the matter for the first time,
suspending alternate side of the street parking on “Christmas, Yom Kippur, Rosh
ha-Shanah, Good Friday, the first two and last two days of Succoth, Shabuoth,
the first two and last’ two days of Passover and all state and national holidays.”
City Parking Bill Signed, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1970, at 50. Note that, except for
Christmas and Good Friday, discussed supra, each of the Jewish holidays on the
list is a day on which many observant Jews cannot drive or engage in other
activities that Jewish law defines as “work.”
130. First, the City Transportation Department expanded the list to include a
raft of other Christian holidays, including Eastern Orthodox Good Friday,
Ascension Day, the Feast of the Assumption, All Saints Day, and the Feast of the
Immaculate Conception. See City’s Parking Rules for Holidays in 1986, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1986. Then the City brought other religious traditions on board. By
2014, the suspension calendar also included, for example, Christian holy days
including Ash Wednesday and Orthodox Holy Thursday, Muslim holy days
including Idul-Fitr and Idul Adha, and the Hindu holy day of Diwali. See NEW
YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Alternate Side Parking, NYC.GOV,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/motorist/alternate-side-parking.shtml#cal.
131. See Letter from Prof. John Stratton Hawley to Chair of N.Y.C. Counsel
Comm. on Transp. (Sep. 17, 2005), http://www.sree.net/stuff/diwaliparking
.html#hawley (urging inclusion of the Hindu Festival Diwali to mark the
substantial Hindu presence in the City and “recognize and celebrate the cultural
and religious plurality of our citizenry.”).
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A similar if less obvious story can be told about the
virtually absolute testimonial privilege that protects clergy
from disclosing certain communications with “penitents” who
disclose information to them in confidence.132 The clergy
privilege was not known, or was at least controversial, in the
common law.133 It is, however, now a part of the law in all fifty
states134 as well as federal common law in cases involving
federal questions.135 The first cases recognizing the privilege
sought to protect Catholic priests, as an accommodation to
their very specific sacramental understanding of the seal of
confession.136 Indeed, some early authority explicitly held

132. See generally JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE RIGHT
SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1989).

TO

133. See id. at 111; Walter J. Walsh, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: An
Hibernocentric Essay in Post Colonial Jurisprudence, 80 IND. L.J. 1037, 1045
(2005); Chad Horner, Note, Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: the PriestPenitent Privilege in a Diverse Society, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 701 (1997). But cf.
BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 132, at 47-54, 99 (discussing pre-Reformation
common law antecedents to the privilege).
134. See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a
Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1627, 1639 (2003). The nature of the privilege does, however, vary in some
important ways from one jurisdiction to another. State laws differ, for example,
on whether the cleric or the confider, or both or neither, can waive the privilege.
See id. at 1650-53; Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse
Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion,
71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 755-59 (1987). More to the point of the discussion here, state
statutes differ as to the precise religious or communicative context in which the
privilege can be invoked. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
135. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 376-77 (3d Cir. 1990); 3
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 506.03.
136. For an early history of the privilege in the United States, see Walsh, supra
note 133; Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(2004). The case Walsh discusses is People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813),
in 1 W. L.J. 109 (1843), reprinted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1
CATH. LAW. 199, 199-209 (1955). Phillips, as a case under the Free Exercise
Clause, was explicitly grounded in the distinct sacramental status of the
confession in Catholic belief in practice. The question, as posed by the court, was:
[W]hether a Roman catholic priest shall be compelled to disclose what he
has received in confession—in violation of his conscience, of his clerical
engagements, and of the canons of his church, and with a certainty of
being stripped of his sacred functions, and cut off from religious
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that the privilege only applied to Catholic priests. 137 Soon,
though, legislatures extended the privilege to all clergy,138
often even if their own theological understandings or
religious principles did not require it.139 The privilege
according to some statutory formulations even applies,
ironically enough, in contexts in which a clergyperson might,
according to her own religious understanding, be required to
disclose certain “confidential” communications.140
communion and social intercourse with the denomination to which he
belongs.
Id. at 200.
137. Thus, in People v. Smith, 2 NY City H Rptr 77, 80 (N.Y. Ct. Oyer &
Terminer Richmond County 1817), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS VOL. 1
779, 783-84 (John D. Lawson ed., 1914), excerpted in Privileged Communication
to Clergymen, supra note 136, at 209-11, the court, rejecting a claim of privilege
with respect to communications to a Protestant minister, distinguished “between
auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline, according to the
canons of the church, and those made to a minister of the gospel in confidence,
merely as a friend or adviser.”
138. Most famously, the New York Legislature enacted a statutory privilege, the
model for that in other States, requiring that “No minister of the gospel, or priest
of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions
made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by
the rules or practice of such denomination.” 2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3,
§ 72 (1828) (emphasis added). The current version of the privilege in New York
reads: “Unless the person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a
clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited Christian Science
practitioner, shall not be allowed [sic] disclose a confession or confidence made to
him in his professional character as spiritual advisor.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505
(CONSOL. 2003).
139. “The more modern approach, which has become the majority position, is to
discard any requirement of confession or penitential communication as a
precondition to the application of the privilege, and to protect any confidential
communication with a clergy member whenever the parishioner is ‘seeking
spiritual counsel and advice.’” Cassidy, supra note 134, at 1647 (quoting VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-400 (2007)). Some states (adopt/take/etc…) a stricter position based
on language similar to that in the original 1828 New York statute, see supra note
138, which privileges “only confessions made in the course of discipline enjoined
by the rules” of the cleric’s specific religious tradition. Id. at 1645-46 (emphasis
omitted). Yet other states define the privilege more expansively to include any
communications made to a cleric in his or her “professional capacity.” See id. at
1649.
140. For discussion of some of the potential tensions between religious duties to
disclose and secular testimonial privileges and other norms of confidentiality, see,
for example, People v. Bragg, 824 N.W.2d 170, 173-77 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012)
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A final instance of the remarkable American impulse to
extend paradigm cases of religious rights and privileges
beyond their original logic is known to very few but clergy
and their accountants and tax advisors. The problem is this:
according to general tax principles, employees who live in
employer-provided housing as a requirement of their
employment and for the convenience of their employers are
entitled to exclude the value of their housing from their gross
income.141 Classic examples include lighthouse keepers,
resident building managers, and the President of the United
States. This rule would apply uncontroversially to most
Catholic priests and other clergy who live in rectories and the
like.142 But other clergy, whose religions’ ecclesiastical or
theological principles do not require clergy to live above the
store, so to speak, would not have that tax benefit. For
decades, however, the tax code has contained a special
provision, often called the parsonage exemption, whose
essential function is to extend to all clergy the same tax
treatment as priests living in rectories.143 While the
(excluding testimony of pastor to whom defendant, who had sexually assaulted a
nine-year old, had confessed, even though pastor had sought out the conversation
with the defendant and believed that sharing the confession with the family and
authorities was consistent with Baptist doctrine and was “the right thing to do”);
Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy Doctrine:
Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 472-74 (2011); Alan
Mayor Sokobin, Rabbinic Confidentiality: American Law and Jewish Law, 38 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1179 (2007); Andrew Chow, Mich. Court Mulls Church Confession
Issue, FINDLAW (Feb. 13, 2012 5:04 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/
2012/02/mich-court-mulls-church-confession-issue.html.
141. There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value
of any . . . lodging furnished to him, his spouse, or any of his dependents
by or on behalf of his employer for the convenience of the employer, but
only if . . . the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business
premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.
I.R.C. § 119(a) (2012).
142. I am eliding here the question of the precise nature of the “employment” or
other legal relationship between priests and the Church, a question that remains
in certain other contexts a matter of real debate. See Perry Dane, “Omalous”
Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1715-16, 1734-35 (2004) [hereinafter Dane,
“Omalous” Autonomy].
143. In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include—
(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his
compensation; or

346

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

parsonage exemption seems at first glance like a gratuitous
and extraordinary financial windfall for clergy,144 its
underlying purpose—to mitigate what would otherwise be
the tax code’s differential treatment of various religious
traditions based solely on different ecclesiastical
structures—locates it comfortably within the larger impulse
to extend paradigm cases of religious rights or privileges
across the religious spectrum.
Having gone through in some detail how the federalism
example fits into my description of “analogy of dignity,” I
don’t feel the same need to do so here. A few points, though,
are worth emphasizing.
First, the instances I’ve described cannot be explained by
any simple application of principles such as religious liberty
or religious equality. To be sure, some of the paradigm
cases—particularly suspending of alternate-side parking
regulations during Jewish holy days and protecting the seal
of sacramental confession—do raise important religious
liberty concerns. But the extended cases are nonparadigmatic precisely because they are much less obvious.145
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the
extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent such
allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home, including
furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost of utilities.
I.R.C. § 107 (2012).
144. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
145. Of the three instances just discussed, the general clergy privilege probably
comes closest to being defensible on general religious liberty principles. Some
religious traditions, even if they do not attach sacramental significance or
absolute inviolability to the secrecy of certain clergy-congregant communications,
might nevertheless have strong religious reasons for treating them as
confidential. But this is not a universal religious belief, and yet the law of clergy
privilege makes little effort to sort among cases on such theological grounds. The
clergy privilege might also be defended as an application of principles of religious
institutional autonomy, which often operate across all religious traditions
irrespective of specific theological differences. See Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy,
supra note 142, at 1734 (“The right to institutional autonomy does not depend, as
the right to religion-based exemptions does, on asserting a specific conflict
between a secular legal norm and a sincerely held religious belief. To the contrary,
the right to autonomy, correctly understood, attaches to a religious institution
regardless of its motives and beliefs.”). But this argument also only goes so far:
the clergy privilege, in some cases, as when it is invoked by a communicant to
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Similarly, religious equality principles most obviously
require that like cases be treated alike, not that unlike cases
be treated alike. Nevertheless, American church-state
tradition seems particularly sensitive—not always or
consistently, but often enough to be noticeable—to the
appearance of religious equality, even when a “neutral law of
general applicability”146 might justify different treatment.147
Second, with respect to the impulse toward uniformity of
treatment across religious differences, much more so than
with respect to uniformity of the legal status of the states,
the seams, complications, and counter-arguments are often
clearly visible. As I write this, for example, the parsonage
exemption, which I for one would gladly defend as an
expression of at least a complicated version of religious
equality, is undergoing its most serious constitutional attack
yet for enshrining a gross inequality between clergy and all
other taxpayers.148 In a sense, this is an intractable
problem—either the law treats priests and rabbis the same,
as under current law, or it treats rabbis and their next-door
neighbors the same, as the opponents of the parsonage
exemption insist it should. Such dilemmas are, however, only
more or less visibly, built into the logic of all arguments for
“analogy of dignity.”

prevent disclosures that a clergyperson might actually want, or feel duty-bound,
to make, arguably impedes rather than promotes religious institutional
autonomy.
146. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
147. This is, it seems to me, a peculiarly American impulse. Many other legal
systems feel no similar compunction. See Dane, The Public, the Private, and the
Sacred: Variations on a Theme of Nomos and Narrative, supra note 128, at 40-41.
148. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, No. 11-cv-626-bbc, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166076, *2-3, *62 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2013) (holding that the
parsonage exemption violates the Establishment Clause because it “provides a
benefit to religious persons and no one else, even though doing so is not necessary
to alleviate a special burden on religious exercise,” but staying injunction until
the conclusion of appeals). For my argument that the decision “is quite wrong . . .
[and] misunderstands an important piece of our church-state dispensation,” see
Perry Dane, The Parsonage Exemption and Constitutional Glare, CENTER FOR L.
& RELIGION F., (Nov. 27, 2013), http://clrforum.org/2013/11/27/parsonageexemption/.
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3.
Finally, and most evocatively for my purposes here,
consider the institution of familial adoption. Recall Cicero’s
thought that if “the first bond of union is that between
husband and wife[,] the next [is] that between parents and
children; then we find one home, with everything in
common.”149 The bonds—of affection, rights, obligations, and
traditionally mutual economic relations—between parents
and children are at least as primordial and central as the
bonds of marriage. Moreover, the paradigmatic form of the
parent-child relation is, for a variety of reasons, including the
obvious evolutionary one, paradigmatically biological.150
Nevertheless, throughout human history, for a variety of
reasons, not all children have been raised by their biological
parents.151 Many societies have accommodated this fact only
informally,152 or on an ad hoc basis, or by resort to legal
categories other than adoption.153 The common law, for

149. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
150. For helpful philosophical discussions, see, for example, NORVIN RICHARDS,
THE ETHICS OF PARENTHOOD 8-26 (2010); Don S. Browning, Adoption and the
Moral Significance of Kin Altruism, in THE MORALITY OF ADOPTION: SOCIALPSYCHOLOGICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 52 (Timothy P. Jackson
ed., 2005); Edgar Page, Parental Rights, J. APPLIED PHIL. 187, 198-200 (1984). For
one of many accounts that treat biology as important but not necessarily
dispositive, see, for example, MICHAEL W. AUSTIN, CONCEPTIONS OF PARENTHOOD:
ETHICS AND THE FAMILY (2007). To be sure, any straightforward biological account
of at least presumptive parenthood has been challenged, not only by adoption,
which is my focus here, but by the new reproductive technologies. That topic,
however, is far beyond the scope of this Article, as is the possibly different role
played by mothers and fathers in the biological paradigm (particularly in such
aberrant cases as rape).
151. See generally Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE
L.J. 1077 (2003); Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9
VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the
American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971).
152. For an important account of informal adoption in the American nation as
reflected in literary sources, see CAROL J. SINGLEY, ADOPTING AMERICA:
CHILDHOOD, KINSHIP, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN LITERATURE (2011).
153. For a detailed discussion of the Jewish legal category of “A Person Who
Raises Another’s Child,” see Michael J. Broyde, Adoption, Personal Status, and
Jewish Law, in THE MORALITY OF ADOPTION: SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL,
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example, had no formal provision for legal adoption.154
Nevertheless, around the 1850s, American states began to
enact adoption statutes that, to lesser or greater degrees,
established a legal status modeled on biological parenthood
but designed to recognize families that were not made up of
biological parents and their biological children.155
Again, I do not need to go through the entire litany to
explain how this development is a clear example of what I
have called “analogy of dignity.” I should, though, again
make several distinct points.
First, while adoption law was based from the start on the
paradigmatic case of biological parenthood, the degree of
identity between the two has varied over time and place. For
example, the American law of adoption did not at first treat
adopted children as equal to biological children with respect,
for example, to inheritance from persons (grandparents,
uncles, half-siblings, etc.) other than their adoptive
parents.156
Second, the extension of the biological paradigm to
adoption has rarely been unproblematic. For example, the

THEOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 150, at 128 [hereinafter
Broyde, Adoption, Personal Status, and Jewish Law].
154. See Tillinghast v. Chin Mon ex rel Chin Yuen, 25 F.2d 262, 266 (1st Cir.
1928) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The Egyptians, Hebrews, Greeks, Babylonians,
Romans, and Spanish, all practiced adoption; while at common law, adoption was
unknown.”).
155. See Presser, supra note 151, at 461-79. For an updated discussion of the
complex cultural and religious forces at work in both the early and more recent
legal history of adoption, see Stephen B. Presser, Law, Christianity, and
Adoption, in THE MORALITY OF ADOPTION: SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL, THEOLOGICAL,
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 150, at 219.
156. See, e.g., Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill. 26 (Ill. 1881); Hockaday v. Lynn, 98
S.W. 585 (Mo. 1906), Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 97 A. 378 (R.I. 1916). This
older view has now generally been repudiated by both legislation and case law.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-8 (LexisNexis 2013) (“For all purposes of
intestate succession, including succession by, through, or from a person, both
lineal and collateral, an adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of the
child’s adopting parents, and the child shall cease to be treated as a child of the
natural parents and of any previous adopting parents.”); Elliott v. Hiddleson, 303
N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 1981) (overruling the “stranger to the adoption” doctrine
and citing similar cases in other states).
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deep insistence at one time on secrecy in adoption157 and the
complete excision of the biological parent from any possible
relation with her child were motivated, at least in part, by a
determined effort to fashion adopted families in the exact
image of biological families.158 But that effort was probably
doomed to be overturned.159
Third, the imaginative construct of adoption law remains
profoundly challenged from two ends. On the one hand, a
whole movement centered on the rights of adoptive children
has championed the continued relevance—and legal
protection—of biological ties alongside adoptive ones.160 On
the other hand, some theorists have pointed to adoption laws
as a datum in their arguments against biological and genetic
“essentialism” in our more general understanding of the
parent-child relation.161 Yet the important point remains that
157. See Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History
of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 370-71 (2001).
See generally E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE
HISTORY OF ADOPTION (2000).
158. See ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE
MODERN UNITED STATES 122 (2008) (“Until the late 1960s, matching was the
dominant paradigm in adoption; it promised to deliver naturalness and
authenticity. . . . Exacting specifications aspired to create families that appeared
to be authorized by nature rather than by society.”); Cahn, supra note 151, at
1148-49.
159. See HERMAN, supra note 158, at 227-28; cf. CARP, supra note 157, at 196222 (relating rise of open adoption movement to breakdown of traditional
assumptions about adoption, including ethnic matching).
160. See BETTY JEAN LIFTON, LOST AND FOUND: THE ADOPTION EXPERIENCE
(1979); Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity and the Constitution: The
Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 172-75 (1999). For an
important theological effort to uphold the centrality of biologically-grounded “kin
altruism” while also emphasizing the “importance and dignity of adoption” as a
solution to family breakdown, see Browning, supra note 150, at 62-64.
161. See, e.g., Charlotte Witt, Adoption, Biological Essentialism, and Feminist
Theory, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 280 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan
Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004); Charlotte Witt, Family Resemblances: Adoption,
Personal Identity, and Genetic Essentialism, in ADOPTION MATTERS:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND FEMINIST ESSAYS 135 (Sally Haslanger & Charlotte Witt eds.,
2005); cf. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a “Parent”? The Claims
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991) (arguing
for priority of those who first intend to have a child over claims of biologic parents
or gestational carriers). But see, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and
the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683 (2001) (arguing that
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these debates did not need to be resolved as a prerequisite to
enacting adoption laws, and current laws of adoption
continue operating, with disputes about their details but not
their basic desirability, even as such debates continue to
swirl around them.
C.
In light of my discussion of the law of adoption, the basic
outline of an “analogy of dignity” argument for same-sex
marriage should now be obvious.162 Assume, as suggested
here, that the paradigm of marriage is heterosexual.
Nevertheless, not all persons are heterosexual, nor is all love
and mutual support. And committed, loving homosexual
couples deserve a place in the symbolic and institutional
traditional notions of biologically-based parental status, alienable only
voluntarily or on proof of unfitness, best accord with fundamental constitutional
principles and best protect those families most vulnerable for economic and other
reasons to undue state intervention).
It is possible, of course, to criticize some of the “biologic bias” in the law without
radically critiquing the relevance of biology as such. See, e.g., ELIZABETH
BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD
PRODUCTION (Beacon Press 1999) (1993); Elizabeth Bartholet, What’s Wrong with
Adoption Law?, 4 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 263 (1996). See generally WHAT IS
PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY (Linda C. McClain &
Daniel Cere eds., 2013); Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of
Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6 (1980).
Jewish tradition, though not recognizing adoption as such, treats the raising of
another’s child as “special, sacred, a manifestation of holiness, and covenantal. It
is such precisely because it is [a relationship grounded in] choice . . . and thus
different from (and not to be confused with) natural parenthood, which lacks these
basic covenantal components.” Broyde, Adoption, Personal Status, and Jewish
Law, supra note 153, at 141.
For similar though theologically more foundational grounds, the idea of adoption
has historically been a central religious metaphor in Christian thought, with
complicated cultural implications for the biological paradigm in ordinary family
life. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER, GALATIANS 193 (Alister McGrath & J.I. Packer eds.,
Crossway Books 1998) (1575) (“The apostle is saying, in effect, ‘If you believe and
are baptized into Christ—if you believe that he is that promised Seed of Abraham
who bought the blessing to all the Gentiles—then you are the children of
Abraham, not by nature, but by adoption.’”).
162. The argument here further develops my earlier more tentative suggestions
in Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9, at 1182-86.
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architecture of contemporary society163 along with all the
other forms of association out of which our larger community
and culture are built.164
Had our moral and political tradition always valorized
gay and lesbian love and long-term, equal, same-sex
relationships, law and culture would probably long ago have
lent some structure to those relationships, and there is good
reason to suppose, in light of the earlier arguments in this
Article, that such a structure would have been distinct from
marriage. But it is pointless to try to confect that imaginary
structure out of the counterfactual ether. Perhaps the best
contemporary society can do is to adapt an existing structure
to a new purpose.
Under different circumstances, deep and lasting
homosexual love might well have been valorized, not as
same-sex marriage, but as sexualized (and perhaps
formalized) friendship.165 Indeed, classic homosexual culture
and literature have often conceived of gay love as a form of
sexualized friendship.166 And the historical practice and
163. I leave to one side the continuing vigorous debate among historians and
theorists about whether the very idea of gay or homosexual identity (as opposed
to same-sex sexual behavior) is a largely modern social construction that can only
be applied anachronistically to past societies, even ones in which same-sex sex
was accepted or celebrated. Compare John Boswell, Revolutions, Universals, and
Sexual Categories, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN
PAST 17, 35 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989), with DAVID M. HALPERIN, HOW
TO DO THE HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY 48-81 (2004). See generally WILLIAM B.
TURNER, A GENEALOGY OF QUEER THEORY (2000); Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating
Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79
VA. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
164. I have elsewhere similarly referred to the “symbolic economy—the
scaffolding of values—of law and society.” Holy Secular Institution, supra note 9,
at 1182.
165. Consider in this connection Alan Bray’s poignant and powerful article, A
Traditional Rite for Blessing Friendship, in LOVE, SEX, INTIMACY, AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN MEN, 1550-1800, at 87, 89 (Katherine O’Donnell & Michael O’Rourke
eds., 2003), which discusses heraldic devices and joint burials that were employed
from at least the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries to honor deep friendships
and “sworn brothers.” As with the rituals discussed in John Boswell’s well-known
book, see supra note 50, it is rarely apparent whether the relationships marked
in this way were sexual. See Bray, supra.
166. See, e.g., George E. Haggerty, Male Love and Friendship in the Eighteenth
Century, in LOVE, SEX, INTIMACY, AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN MEN, 1550-1800,
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theory of friendship, while resting on the possibility of a pure
form of companionship without the distractions of sex or
kinship or family, has also at times flirted with the erotic at
its edges. Consider, for example, the endless and sometimes
historically tin-eared debates over whether this or that great
historical friendship marked by passionate declarations of
love did or did not remain Platonic. Of course, lasting and
deep gay relationships do not precisely fit classical accounts
of pure friendship. But they do not fit classical accounts of
marriage either, and all I am suggesting is that, until not
that long ago, the former analogy might have been more
compelling than the latter.167
In today’s actual world, however, the model of
friendship—even extended and reshaped—will not fit the
bill, for several reasons. To begin with, while one of the
strengths of friendship has been its freedom from legal rights
and obligations, and therefore legal entanglements, that is
also its weakness, particularly in a culture in which so much
of everyday life—from tax status to hospital visitations—
turns on a network of thick legal rules. Some of the legal
rights and obligations that same-sex pairs might need could
supra note 165, at 70, 72; Rictor Norton, The Homosexual Pastoral Tradition in
English Renaissance Literature, RICTORNORTON.CO.UK (June 20, 2008),
http://rictornorton.co.uk/pastor00.htm.
In a different twist on old themes, some contemporary Christians have chosen to
affirm the reality and dignity of gay sexual identity while still accepting
traditional Christian norms forbidding same-sex sex. This leads them to embrace
a practice of celibacy grounded in the nurturing of deep “spiritual” friendship. For
a helpful clearinghouse and group blog of voices articulating these views, see
SPIRITUAL FRIENDSHIP, http://spiritualfriendship.org (last updated Jan. 18, 2014).
For an earlier proposal along similar lines, see Oliver O’Donovan, Homosexuality
in the Church: Can There Be a Fruitful Theological Debate?, in THEOLOGY AND
SEXUALITY; CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 373, 380-81 (Eugene F. Rogers,
Jr. ed., 2002).
I should add, lest I be misunderstood, that my own theological and moral
perspective is not sympathetic to this approach for a variety of reasons.
167. Of course, these two institutions—marriage and friendship—overlap, not
only in their substantive and emotional content, but also in the repertoire of
symbols with which they are expressed. Thus, I have already discussed the debate
(arising out of genuine ambiguity) as to whether the medieval rites discussed by
John Boswell are best considered “marriage” ceremonies or “friendship”
ceremonies. See BOSWELL, supra note 50. Similarly, Alan Bray points out the use
of symbolic forms often associated with marriage in the “friendship” rites that are
the focus of his article cited supra note 165.
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be constructed ad hoc, but not enough. Marriage, though, has
had attached to it a range of automatic legal privileges and
rights and duties that would clearly make sense for other
types of pair bonds. Positivity matters. The very fact that law
has embraced marriage is transformative, giving civil
marriage a range of meanings and practical incidents that
render it a different creature than the natural marriage, or
the paradigm of heterosexual marriage, that might exist even
without civil law. And, in the modern age, with its new
conceptions of government and regulation, positivity matters
even more. All this confounds what might in other times and
places have been a perfectly sensible philosophical and
practical conclusion.
Specific legal rules are only one part of the reason,
however, that intense friendship can no longer serve, at least
alone, as an adequate template for committed same-sex
relationships. More important are broader changes in the
valence of friendship and its relation to marriage. Friendship
does not carry the symbolic and emotional weight that it used
to. Philosophers, theologians, and poets could at one time
declare that genuine friendship was a defining human
bond,168 perhaps even a deeper and nobler relationship than
marriage.169 That no longer rings true. In addition, to the
extent that friendship continues to be valued in the
168. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 935, 1058-93, bk. 8-9, §§ 1155a-1172a (Richard McKeon ed. & trans.,
1941); CICERO, De Amicitia, in ON OLD AGE—ON FRIENDSHIP—ON DIVINATION 108
(W.A. Falconer trans., Loeb Classical Library 1923).
Some in the Christian tradition have put a distinctively religious spin on their
understanding of friendship. See, e.g., AELRED OF RIEVAULX, SPIRITUAL FRIENDSHIP
(Marsha L. Dutton ed., Lawrence C. Braceland trans., Liturgical Press 2010)
(1616). And just as human marriage in the Christian view was understood as a
type for Christ’s mystical marriage with his Church, human friendship was
understood as a type for the intimate relationship of the three persons of the
Trinity. See James McEvoy, Ultimate Goods: Happiness, Friendship, and Bliss, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 254, 273 (2003) (“[T]he
friendship of the three divine persons is the exemplar for all nonpossessive, selfgiving amicitia, wherefore friendship is the natural virtue that draws closest to
supernatural charity.”). For a contemporary study along these lines, see PAUL D.
O’CALLAGHAN, THE FEAST OF FRIENDSHIP (2007).
169. See, e.g., MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, On Affectionate Relationships, in THE
COMPLETE ESSAYS 205, 209-10 (M.A. Screech ed. & trans., 1991).
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contemporary imagination, part of the reason is that it has
been imported into marriage itself. Historians and
sociologists emphasize the idea of “companionate marriage”
as a new dimension of the institution.170 Many married
couples now expect, as they might not have in the past, to be
each other’s “best friends.”171 This is largely due to the
egalitarian revolution in marriage, though one can imagine
one without the other. The companionate model of marriage
does not itself destroy the heterosexual paradigm of
marriage—in some sense, it flows directly out of it—and is
not in itself an argument for same-sex marriage. But it does
indicate that if the best model for committed same-sex
relationships is something like symbolically elevated,
emotionally profound, sexualized friendship, some of that
conceptual space has already been taken—by marriage.
Finally, in light of advances in reproductive technologies,
as well as a series of significant sociological developments,
homosexual couples now routinely act as legal parents and
not only as pair bonds. Various legal tools short of marriage,
including the law of adoption, can accommodate some of
these developments, but not all.
In sum, in the legal system and society in which we live,
the institution of marriage has in some sense done its job too
well. Despite the severe challenges it has faced, marriage has
come to hold a distinct and unparalleled place in our
dignitary imagination, and it carries with it a set of
important legal rights and obligations. None of this
ineluctably requires that the institution of marriage be
extended to same-sex couples. Nevertheless, just as the law
recognizes, for both moral and prudential reasons, the justice
of extending the statuses of parent and child to persons with
no biological relation, it might think it reasonable or
necessary to allow conferring the status of spouse to persons
who are not of the opposite sex. In other words, a humane
society, in the name of respecting both the dignity of its
170. See generally PAUL R. AMATO
AMERICA IS CHANGING (2007).

ET AL.,

ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN

171. See Sylvia Weishaus & Dorothy Field, A Half Century of Marriage:
Continuity or Change?, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 763 (1988). For a skeptical take
on this modern ideal, see ARNOLD A. LAZARUS, MARITAL MYTHS REVISITED: A FRESH
LOOK AT TWO DOZEN MISTAKEN BELIEFS ABOUT MARRIAGE 9-12 (2001).
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members and the utility of its institutions, will at least
consider the possibility of same-sex marriage.
1. Note, again, that this form of argument for same-sex
marriage does not deny the paradigmatic character of
heterosexual marriage, nor even denies the rationality or
coherence of limiting marriage to heterosexual couples. It
does not erase the paradigm, or hollow it out, or abstract
away from it, but rather proposes extending it to a different
context. It is a contingent argument, rooted in our time and
place. It is an argument for empathy, dignity, and decency,
not for logic or acidic equality.
In particular, consider in this connection one of the more
interesting and even arresting arguments against extending
marriage to same-sex couples: that such a move is
frighteningly statist, even tyrannical, in its implications. As
R.R. Reno puts it,
Redefinition of marriage to allow same-sex unions undermines the
proper separation of cultural and governmental power that is so
important for a liberal regime. Marriage . . . is more primitive and
ancient than anything resembling organized government. . . .
Government has always treated marriage like murder—a moral
fact recognized rather than a policy formulated, a given truth
framed in law rather than something to be fed into the machinery
of political debate. . . .
[G]ay marriage won’t just happen if government “gets out of the
way.” It requires creating a new possibility that will not come to
pass if traditional institutions and moral traditions are left alone. .
..
Tyranny isn’t just a situation in which the government is telling
you what to do at every moment. It’s also a society in which
government says that, if necessary, it can. . . . If legislatures and
courts can redefine marriage, what can’t it intervene to reshape and
re-purpose?172

172. R.R. Reno, Gay Marriage and Conservatism, FIRST THINGS (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2013/04/gay-marriage-andconservatism/rr-reno. For similar arguments, see, for example, Teresa Stanton
Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage: Asking for the Impossible?, 47 CATH. L.
REV. 1245, 1264 (1998) (“Marriage exists independent of the state. It is created
through the consensual act of self-giving by a man and a woman.”); Between Man
and Woman: Questions and Answers About Marriage and Same-Sex Unions,
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-
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But same-sex marriage need not, if I am right, “redefine
marriage” in Reno’s strong sense. It can leave “traditional”
marriage intact, while also responding to a distinct set of
moral imperatives that are themselves ancient, powerful,
and persuasive.
2. Framing the argument as I have helps explain why
same-sex marriage mimics the precise form of heterosexual
marriage—including its rules and assumptions about
exclusivity, fidelity, hurdles to dissolution, and the like.
3. It also helps explain, however, the impulse in some
quarters to mark somehow the difference between the
paradigmatic heterosexual case of marriage and its extension
to same-sex couples. The idea of “civil unions” can be
understood, at least in part, as such an effort.173
4. Even jurisdictions that have embraced same-sex
marriages find themselves puzzled about how completely to
assimilate them into the rules surrounding heterosexual
marriages. An obvious example: the law typically creates a
presumption (rebuttable or not, to varying degrees in
different states) that the husband in a heterosexual marriage
is the parent of any child born to the mother during the
marriage. But does it make sense to apply the same
presumption to homosexual married couples?174
and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/promotion-and-defense-ofmarriage/questions-and-answers-about-marriage-and-same-sex-unions.cfm
(“Marriage is a basic human and social institution. Though it is regulated by civil
laws and church laws, it did not originate from either the church or state, but
from God. Therefore, neither church nor state can alter the basic meaning and
structure of marriage.”) (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
173. See Dane, Intersecting Worlds, supra note 22.
174. In the United States, the trend seems to be for jurisdictions that have
recognized same-sex marriage to also extend the legal presumption of parentage
to the same-sex spouses of biological parents. See Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 354 (Iowa 2013) (extending legal parenthood to samesex spouse of biological parent); Hunter v. Rose, 975 N.E.2d 857 (Mass. 2012)
(same); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 216-24 (N.J. 2006) (striking down nonmarital Domestic Partnership Act partly because it did not provide presumption
of dual parentage to the non-biological partner of a child born to a domestic
partner); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 247 (2009); see also Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of SameSex Couples Deserve the Security Blanket of the Parentage Presumption, 44 FAM.
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5. At the same time, as with the law of adoption, samesex marriage can become the catalyst for much deeper
debates. For example, some commentators support the
hollowing out of the heterosexual paradigm of marriage not
merely because it facilitates an argument for same-sex
marriage, but because they reject the paradigm itself and all
that it connotes about the norms of sexuality and family.
Other commentators, as I suggested at the start, would
rather reject marriage entirely and are therefore at best
grudging in their support of the campaign for same-sex
marriage.
This is not the place to try to address those arguments or
resolve those debates. The only point worth making, though,
is that these controversies, as with similar disputes arising
out of the institution of adoption, need not be resolved before
same-sex marriage is considered, and they can continue, and
probably will for a long time, even after same-sex marriage
becomes a feature of the law.
In this connection, the worry that extending marriage to
same-sex couples might (though it need not necessarily or
logically) undermine the cultural and legal coherence of the
institution and even threaten the meaning that heterosexual
couples attach to it is legitimate, and same-sex marriage
advocates are wrong to ridicule it.175 Consider, for example,
CT. REV. 74, 80 (2006). But as one commentator has argued, when “conception
occurs through sexual intercourse, the parentage presumption is inadequate
unless accompanied by legislation settling when, by whom, and on what basis the
presumption can be rebutted,” and virtually no American jurisdictions have
directly addressed these complexities. Polikoff, supra, at 247.
Interestingly, many of the foreign countries that now recognize same-sex
marriage have been more hesitant to extend the presumption of parentage along
with it. See Macarena Sáez, General Report, Same-Sex Marriage, Same-Sex
Cohabitation, and Same-Sex Families Around the World: Why “Same” Is So
Different, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 4-7 (2011).
175. For a classic example of such ridicule, see How Same-Sex Marriages
Harmed Mine, BASTION OF SASS (June 29, 2013), http://bastionofsass.
blogspot.com/2013/06/how-same-sex-marriages-harmed-mine.html.
As more states allowed same-sex marriage, warnings came:
[A]bout how same-sex marriages will harm non-same-sex marriages.
What awfulness would happen to my marriage? Nothing, as much as I
could tell. . . . ‘Vote against the right of gays to marry!’ voters were
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the argument that: “After accepting same-sex marriage, you
just can’t say that there’s anything especially important,
normative, crucial to the common good, or ideal for children
or society about the man and the woman who make the baby
sticking around and loving each other and the baby, too.”176
This is, in principle, a sensible concern. In other contexts,
we routinely entertain the argument that extending a legal
rule or institution too far “trivializes” the rule itself and its
original purposes and thus makes it more difficult to keep
those purposes in mind.177 Nevertheless, such “undermining”
warned. ‘Save your marriage! Save your children’s marriage! . . . .’ I heard
that my own marriage will loose [sic] its ‘specialness.’ I wasn’t sure what
that meant, but if my marriage was special, wasn’t everyone’s in its own
way? I also heard that same-sex marriage would cut into the rights given
to non-same-sex married couples. Really? Did some people think that
marriage is like a pizza, and as more people come to the pizza party, each
of us gets a smaller and smaller piece to enjoy?! . . . Still, when the
Supreme Court decisions in the Proposition 8 and DOMA cases were
issued . . . concerns about the harm to ‘traditional’ marriages again arose.
And I’ll keep monitoring the resulting harm to my own marriage. But I’m
going to bet that the number of ultimate harmful effects will continue as
it has been: none.
Id.
Rhetorically, this is powerful stuff. Analytically, it misses the point.
176. Maggie Gallahger, Reply to Corvino, in JOHN CORVINO & MAGGIE GALLAGER,
DEBATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 207, 214 (2012).
177. See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF
COPYRIGHT (Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 285 (2009)
(“The constitutional subject matter of copyright is materials for learning. . . . Part
of the problem, however, is that courts have trivialized copyright by extending it
to protect all manner of works, from casual doodles to ornamental aspects of
useful articles, that are insignificant in light of copyright’s purpose and function.
Because copyright protects such objects only as items of commerce (not as works
of learning), there is a cross-fertilization effect that reduces the status of learning
materials to that of mere commodities for the marketplace . . . .”) (footnote
omitted); Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal
Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2010) (arguing that the right to privacy
articulated by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis was a “weighty right” to
“personal autonomy” and “personal authenticity,” which can only be “trivialize[d]”
and “cheapen[ed]” if it is broadened into a merely private and “much less
defensible right not be annoyed”); Pamela M. Prah, Federal Enforcement of ADA
Falls Short, Civil Rights Commission Says in Report, 67 U.S.L.W. 2199 (Oct. 13,
1998) (“‘Many of these cases defy credulity and are absolutely not what we
intended when we passed the ADA in 1990,’ Redenbaugh wrote, listing more than
a dozen ADA cases that he said illustrate how the concepts behind the ADA have
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is not inevitable, particularly if the sort of discourse I have
suggested here were to gain some traction. That is to say, if
same-sex marriage is understood as a supplement to the
“traditional” account of marriage, rather than a rejection of
it, then same-sex marriage need not undermine it any more
than the possibility of adoption would necessarily undermine
the cultural and psychological incidents of biological
parenthood. If anything, there is a good case to be made that,
given the current erosion of many of the behavior
assumptions surrounding marriage and its relation to both
sex and child-bearing, same-sex marriage might actually
strengthen the institution overall rather than weaken it.178
6. Finally, it is important to notice how the struggle for
same-sex marriage has brought with it efforts to broaden the
circle even wider. As noted earlier, those efforts seem to me
to be entirely expected whenever a paradigm case is extended
beyond its original boundaries. They are simply an
alternative response—celebratory rather than defensive—to
the line-drawing problem that has popped up several times
in this Article.
Nevertheless, an argument of the sort I have outlined
here is much better able to address those efforts than one
grounded in an outright rejection of the heterosexual
paradigm of marriage. Put simply, the point to remember is
that heterosexual marriage is simply closed to many gay men
and lesbians unless they are willing to engage in a lie. A
decent society might therefore find a place for them in the
institution of marriage even if they do not fit its paradigm.
Other persons in complex relationships—such as nonsexual
friends or kin who depend on each other for economic or
emotional support—might deserve certain legal rights and
protections. But they simply do not need marriage in the
same way or for the same reasons as homosexual couples.
been expanded ‘in almost every way imaginable,’ trivializing the term ‘disability.’
‘What seems to be happening is that, even with the EEOC’s rejection of half of its
complaints, the courts are dealing with many cases that appear outrageous to
most Americans and that damage the reputation of both the ADA and those of us
with severe disabilities,’ according to Redenbaugh, who was blinded and lost most
of his hands in an explosion at the age of 17.”).
178. See RAUCH, supra note 69, at 104-22; ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY
NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 104-14 (1996).
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Nor (as some have argued) do their claims demand the
abolition or legal marginalization of marriage. That is not to
say that such further changes in our ideas about marriage
can be dismissed out of hand on their own terms. But they
are not required simply because society and the law have
extended marriage to same-sex couples.
D.
This essay has invoked a good many legal ideas and
examples. But it is a fair question what sort of legal
difference its argument might make. This is not the place to
canvass those issues in detail. But I can venture a few
thoughts.
1.
The analysis here unsettles the most straightforward
means-end equality argument for same-sex marriage. It
suggests that even though extending marriage to same-sex
couples might be right and good, that would not be because
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples is irretrievably
irrational, or incoherent, or necessarily invidious and
bigoted. The simple legal implication, if this argument is
correct, is that a constitutional right to same-sex marriage
could not be grounded in the standard mores of equal
protection doctrine, particularly the customary forms of
rational basis review and even, for that matter, intermediate
scrutiny.179

179. An entirely different—and much simpler—question was posed by statutes
such as Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which denied
the several thousand federal incidents of marriage to same-sex couples. As the
Supreme Court held, DOMA did not purport to define marriage or limit who was
entitled to marry; all it did was discriminate, in a sweeping and often irrational
manner, against one set of couples who were undoubtedly married under state
law. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see also, e.g.,
Massachusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2012). I should add in the interests of full disclosure that this was
essentially the argument that my colleagues and I on the Jewish Social Policy
Action Network advanced in an amicus brief I principally drafted in the First
Circuit case. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Jewish Social Policy Action Network,

362

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

The important next question, then, is whether something
like an argument from “analogy of dignity” can find a place
in constitutional discourse, whether only on a State level or
in federal constitutional law too. Lawrence v. Texas, which
struck down laws criminalizing homosexual sexual conduct,
might point in that direction, particularly in its insistence
that the state cannot “demean the existence” of gay persons
by forbidding them to engage in sexual practices central to
their very identity as human beings.180 The linchpin to
applying that theme in Lawrence to the marriage question
would be the observation that both laws against same-sex sex
and laws against same-sex marriage try to categorically deny
to gay men and lesbians who are honest to themselves any
access at all to a vital human good. In the case of marriage,
that denial might be rational. But that does not make it
constitutional.181
To see the point more clearly, consider the often-made
comparison to Loving v. Virginia,182 which struck down laws
restricting interracial marriages.183 Opponents of same-sex
marriage are right that Loving is not directly on point in the
current debate. Loving really was a simple equality case. The
laws at issue in Loving did not so much define marriage as
they employed the regulation of marriage to further
irrational ideas of racial purity and invidious ends of racial
subordination.184 For that matter, even supporters of those

Massachusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214), 2011 WL 5833104.
180. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). To be sure, Lawrence carefully
precluded its direct application to the question of same-sex marriage. Id. at 585.
181. See Conkle, supra note 31, at 37-42 (arguing that restrictions on same-sex
marriage should survive an honest “rational basis” inquiry but could be struck
down on the basis of substantive due process and a heightened equal protection
standard working together and informed by consideration of “evolving social
values”).
182. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
183. Id. at 11-12.
184. See id. at 2.
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laws never claimed that Blacks and Whites could not, in some
essential sense, marry—only that they should not.185
Nevertheless, in one crucial sense, bans on same-sex
marriage are actually more onerous than bans on interracial
marriage. Blacks and Whites under Jim Crow could not
marry persons of the other race, which was unjust and racist.
But they could—without denying their fundamental
identity—fall in love and marry somebody. It is that
possibility that is closed off to gay men and women. Loving is
not on point, but it does not need to be. A constitutional claim
to same-sex marriage might rest, not on an analogy to
Loving, but on a careful account of the difference between the
two cases.
If truth be told, though, this would be a doctrinal stretch.
It would require extending existing forms of argument
beyond their inevitable reach and might even demand new
forms of argument. There might indeed be no constitutional
right to same-sex marriage, at least on the basis of the
argument in this Article. Or if there is such a right it might
be best articulated, as it has been already, at the state rather
than the federal level.186
185. Supporters of bans on interracial marriage did sometimes refer to such
marriages as “unnatural.” But that was a much looser use of the term than in the
current debate; in more censorious times, many sorts of marriages have been
described as both perfectly legal and conceptually possible yet in some sense
“unnatural.” See, e.g., Frederick S. Crum, The Statistical Work of Süssmilch, 7
PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS’N 335, 351 (1900-01) (discussing Johann Peter
Süssmilch’s views of the “unnatural marriage of young girls to old men, or of
young men to middle aged widows”).
186. Just before and as this article was going to press, several federal district
courts, claiming to take their cue from United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), did hold that states must extend the institution of marriage to same-sex
couples. See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 26236 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014
U.S. Dist LEXIS 19110 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); Bishop v. United States ex rel.
Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4374 (N.D. Okla. Jan.
14, 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 179331 (D.
Utah Dec. 20, 2013), stay granted, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014). However welcome these
results on emotional grounds, I remain skeptical that either Windsor or equal
protection doctrine requires such holdings. See supra note 179 and accompanying
text (discussing Windsor). Time will tell whether the Supreme Court will ride this
train or bring it to a stop.
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At the end of the day, however, the force of an argument
for same-sex marriage grounded in something like “analogy
of dignity” does not depend on whether it easily translates
into constitutional doctrine, or even on whether it is an
argument about “rights” at all. Not all normative
arguments—even important normative arguments—need be
constitutional or based on a claim of right. I will have more
to say on this vital point in Part IV.
2.
In any event, the legal questions surrounding same-sex
marriage extend well beyond whether or not it is
constitutionally required. I have already described one
complex, almost dialectical, dynamic:187 If opening marriage
to same-sex couples can extend, without undermining, the
heterosexual paradigm of marriage, that would help explain
the instinct to leave most of the legal incidents of marriage
unchanged even in the midst of an arguably revolutionary
change in its premises. But it would also suggest that we
should not be surprised to find some visible seams in the
extension, including debates about nomenclature and the
interplay between law and biology.
But other sorts of questions arise out of the difference
between straightforward equality and “analogy of dignity.”
Here, I want to flag just one: as a series of states have in
recent years enacted statutes recognizing same-sex
marriage, religious freedom activists and academics have
urged legislatures to include provisions protecting religious
objectors to same-sex marriage.188 States have responded,189
187. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
188. See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson
eds., 2008); Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty
Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 274 (2010).
189. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-35a (2013) (providing that religious
organizations and religiously-affiliated nonprofits “shall not be required to
provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges to an
individual if the request for such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods or privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of
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but not nearly to the extent that proponents of such
exemptions have urged.190 The difficulty is this: if objectors

a marriage and such solemnization or celebration is in violation of their religious
beliefs and faith”); N.Y. DOM. REL. §10-b (McKinney 2013) (preserving right of
religious entities and benevolent groups to refuse “to provide services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization
or celebration of a marriage” and of religious and charitable groups “to limit
employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission to or give
preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from taking such
action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for
which it is established or maintained”); Civil Marriage Protection Act, H.B. 438,
430th Reg. Leg. Sess. §§ 2-3 (Md. 2011) (providing, among other things, that
religious organizations and religiously-affiliated nonprofits “may not be required
to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to
an individual if the request for the services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities, goods, or privileges is related” to either “the solemnization of a marriage
or celebration of a marriage that is in violation of the entity’s religious beliefs” or
“the promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs or services,
in violation of the entity’s religious beliefs, unless State or federal funds are
received for that specific program or service”). For helpful summaries and
comparisons of some state laws on the subject, see Robin F. Wilson, Charting the
Success
of
Same-Sex
Marriage
Legislation
(Sept.
1,
2012),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/132/; Statement of William Bassett,
Thomas Berg, Robert Destro, Carl Esbeck, Marie Failinger, Edward Gaffney,
Richard Garnett, Michael McConnell, and Robin Wilson on Religious Freedom
Implications of Proposed Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, 16-17, app. A
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/hawaii-gaffney-et-altestimony-full-final-28oct13-1.pdf [hereinafter Law Professors’ Statement].
190. See, e.g., Law Professors’ Statement, supra note 189 (testimony by a group
of law professors urging expanded religious liberty protection for opponents of
same-sex marriage, including for-profit “small businesses”); Letter from Thomas
C. Berg, Douglas Laycock, Bruce C. Ledewitz, Christopher C. Lund & Michael
Perry, to Members of the Illinois Senate (Dec. 21 2012), available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/illinoisbased-1.docx (urging, among other
things, the enactment of “carefully crafted language . . . fair to both sides . . . [that]
would protect only individuals and very small businesses that are essentially
personal extensions of the individual owner, and only when some other business
is reasonably available to provide the same service”).
More recently, controversial efforts have been mounted in some states to broaden
such religious liberty protections further. See, e.g., H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Kan. 2014) (seeking to establish a right for any “individual or religious
entity” with contrary religious beliefs to refuse, among other things to provide
“any services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges;
provide counseling, adoption, foster care and other social services; or provide
employment or employment benefits, related to, or related to the celebration of,
any marriage, domestic partnership, civil union or similar arrangement” or to
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are simply bigots in the same class as objectors to interracial
marriage, then wide exemptions would seem unwarranted.
But if same-sex marriage is as hard a question as I have
suggested here, and if opposition to it need not be grounded
in mere animus,191 then it begins to look the sort of issue that
might merit more tolerance of diversity and conscientious
objection.192
IV. NATURE, LAW, AND THE DECENT SOCIETY
A.
The most obvious objection to an argument for same-sex
marriage grounded in “analogy of dignity,” at least from other
supporters of same-sex marriage, is that marriage by
“analogy” awards same-sex couples a mere consolation prize,
a second-hand appendage to “real” marriage that is, in a
word, condescending. This is a serious claim, and it requires
a serious response. The form of argument here would indeed
be neither necessary nor apposite if made, say, with respect
to interracial marriage. As I just discussed, that is a
straightforward right, correctly understood to be a matter of
both abstract and practical equality. For that matter, the
form of argument here would also be inapposite and
inappropriate if made with respect to most other questions of
gay and lesbian appeals for equal rights and equal treatment.
The irreducible core of the analysis here is that the question
of same-sex marriage is different, and that it is different
because
of
the
normatively
coherent
legitimate
paradigmatically heterosexual character of marriage. But
that by itself does not make the argument condescending, or
mean that it assigns a second-class status to same-sex
marriages, any more than adopted children are second-class
“treat any marriage, domestic partnership, civil union or similar arrangement as
valid”).
191. See Conkle, supra note 31, at 41-42 (suggesting that a “sensitive
accommodation” of the right to same-sex marriage with the “competing liberties”
of religious objectors would be more difficult if the courts simply characterized
opponents as driven by animus).
192. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28
J.L. & POL. 91, 112-17 (2013).
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compared to biological offspring,193 or, for that matter, than
North Dakota is a second-class state compared to North
Carolina.
But I want to go further. The argument from “analogy of
dignity” is not merely good enough to do the job. It is
distinctively worthy. It understands same-sex marriage not
as an afterthought, but as the product of a polity’s profound
decision to do right by all its members, paradigms be
damned. More important, the argument only looks
condescending if we accept a set of contestable and even
pernicious assumptions in favor of abstraction over
contingency, acidic equality over empathetic decency, and
instrumental rationalism over a forthright exploration of
values and culture.194 Indeed, that we (I include myself)
would even suspect the argument of being condescending
only reflects a poverty in our collective moral, political, and
legal vision.
The questions stirred up here are deep, and I cannot
begin to do them justice in the course of this article. But there
are several ways to begin to think about what I am getting
at.
First, recall the two slogans that have dominated
arguments for same-sex marriage, “Freedom to Marry” and
193. If anything, an important strand in the Western tradition treats adoption,
or at least the idea of adoption, as possessing a higher dignity than biology. See
supra note 161 (citing Jewish and Christian sources on the special dignity of both
real and symbolic adoption).
194. See Robert F. Nagel, Rationalism in Constitutional Law, 4 CONST.
COMMENT. 9, 13 (1987) (“Despite its currency, rationalism is not a synonym for all
methods of moral and intellectual inquiry. It is not the same as insight, creativity,
wisdom, vision, instinct, or empathy.”); id. at 15 (“Treating social choices as a
series of intellectual problems is reassuring to many in the educated classes, but
it also tends to denigrate important values and to stunt moral and political
discourse.”). One need not be (and I am not) a disciple of Michael Oakeshott to
sympathize with his argument that the “predicament of our time is that the
Rationalists have been at work so long on their project of drawing off the liquid
in which our moral ideals were suspended . . . that we are left only with the dry
and gritty residue which chokes us as we try to take it down.” MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 1, 36 (1962). For among the most prominent recent arguments that moral
argument needs to be embedded in specific and textured bodies of tradition, see
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007).
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“Marriage Equality.” Freedom to Marry is as an argument
for liberty. Marriage Equality is, well, an argument for
equality. The obvious missing piece of the puzzle here is
Fraternity.195 The idea of fraternity, sometimes mysterious
and often overlooked,196 is simply the sense of fellow feeling
in a common endeavor,197 or more grandly a commitment to
the “brotherhood of man.”198 What I am calling “analogy of
dignity” is, among other things, an expression of fraternity, a
desire, born of fellow-feeling, to break down distinctions and
disperse the goods of society as widely as possible.
Fraternity, in turn, is deeply related to, if distinct from,
the Golden Rule, one or another version of which appears in
the texts of most of the world’s religions. The Golden Rule is
often equated with the norm of equality, or even
195. “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” was, of course, a classic slogan of the French
Revolution and has been since the late nineteenth century the official motto of
the French state. See generally JACK R. CENSER & LYNN AVERY HUNT, LIBERTY,
EQUALITY, FRATERNITY: EXPLORING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (2001); ROBERT
DARNTON, WHAT WAS REVOLUTIONARY ABOUT THE FRENCH REVOLUTION? (1990).
Similar sentiments appear in other canonical texts. See, e.g., Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948), Art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”).
196. Robert Darnton describes “fraternity” as “the strangest in the trinity of
revolutionary values.” DARNTON, supra note 195, at 17. Nevertheless, it:
swept through Paris with the force of a hurricane in 1792. We can barely
imagine its power, because we inhabit a world organized according to
other principles, such as tenure, take-home pay, bottom lines, and who
reports to whom. We define ourselves as employers or employees, as
teachers or students, as someone located somewhere in a web of
intersecting roles. The Revolution at its most revolutionary tried to wipe
out such distinctions.
Id. at 17. Significantly, Darnton situates this trinity of values, but particularly
fraternity, at the heart of the revolutionary impulse itself, an impulse that at its
worst produced terrible, unexplainable, violence, but at its best “released utopian
energy” and a “sense of boundless possibility.” Id. at 16.
197. Ideas of fraternity, particularly in the United States, have often focused on
economic solidarity. For the classic study, see generally WILSON CAREY
MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA (1973). But there is at least a
family resemblance between that theme and my argument for same-sex marriage
as an expression of social solidarity.
198. DARNTON, supra note 195, at 17.
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constitutional equal protection,199 and that is not entirely
wrong.200 But the Golden Rule in its full flower moves well
beyond straightforward equality. Equality—at least the
conventional understanding of equality—demands that like
cases be treated alike. The Golden Rule asks each of us to put
ourselves in the shoes of our fellow even in difficult, unlike,
cases.201 And that is exactly the work that “analogy of dignity”
does in the argument here for same-sex marriage.
199. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Pub. Health, 497 U.S. 261,
261, 287, 300, 310 (1990) (“Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which
requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones
what they impose on you and me.”) (Scalia, J., concurring). I am indebted to Jon
W. Davidson, Winning Marriage Equality: Lessons from the Court, 17 YALE J. L.
& FEMINISM 297, 300 n.13 (2005) for this wonderfully evocative citation.
200. For fine discussions of some of the complex and multi-layered meanings
embedded in the Golden Rule, see, for example, JEFFREY WATTLES, THE GOLDEN
RULE 3-5 (1996); Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and
Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1529, 1529-34 (2009); Bill Puka, The Golden Rule,
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/goldrule/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2014); see also, e.g., R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963) (a classic
effort to synthesize “golden rule arguments” with universal prescriptivism and
preference utilitarianism); Hans Reiner, The Golden Rule and Natural Law, in
DUTY AND INCLINATION THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MORALITY DISCUSSED AND
REDEFINED WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO KANT AND SCHILLER, 93 PHAENOMENOLOGICA
271, 277-87 (Mark Santos trans., 1983) (discussing, in the context of a natural
law analysis, various meanings of the Golden Rule, including empathy,
autonomy, and reciprocity).
201. See WATTLES, supra note 200, at 174-75 (“To act in accord with the golden
rule is to treat others as comparable with oneself. Comparability, however, does
not entail homogeneity; it does not involve the assumption that people think alike,
feel alike, or are alike . . . . Imaginatively adopting another’s perspective helps
one gain a sense of the differences between self and other; the rule operates with
the assumption that differences need not block understanding.”).
Jürgen Habermas similarly distinguishes between two understandings of
equality: “Equal respect for each person in general as a subject capable of
autonomous action means equal treatment; however, equal respect for each
person as an individual can mean . . . support for the person as a self-realizing
being.” Jürgen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning
Stage 6, in THE MORAL DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE ONGOING DISCUSSION BETWEEN
PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 224, 242 (Thomas Wren ed., 1990). In the
same essay, Habermas discusses the differences and connections between
equality and solidarity, or what I might call fraternity in its social context:
[The] principle [of] solidarity is rooted in the realization that each person
must take responsibility for the other because as consociates all must
have an interest in the integrity of their shared life context in the same
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More broadly, the argument here resonates with a range
of important ideas in contemporary moral philosophy and
moral psychology. Obvious examples include: (1) the family
of views sharing the label of “virtue ethics” that emphasize
the role of character and rightly-formed discernment, instead
of or in addition to abstract rules, as the basis for moral
judgment and the moral life;202 (2) Carol Gilligan’s famous
analysis of the “ethic of care” as a distinct, valuable
perspective over against the “ethic of justice”203 (though one
might also, consistent with Gilligan’s larger point, treat care
as a form of justice);204 (3) Emmanuel Levinas’s emphasis on
existential encounter with the “Other” as the basis for
absolute moral duty;205 and (4) the specifically Christian
way. Justice conceived deontologically requires solidarity as its reverse
side. It is a question not so much of two moments that supplement each
other as of two aspects of the same thing. Every autonomous morality
has to serve two purposes at once: it brings to bear the inviolability of
socialized individuals by requiring equal treatment and thereby equal
respect for the dignity of each one; and it protects intersubjective
relationships of mutual recognition requiring solidarity of individual
members of a community, in which they have been socialized. . . . Moral
norms cannot protect one without the other: they cannot protect the
equal rights and freedoms of the individual without protecting the
welfare of one’s fellow man and of the community to which the
individuals belong.
Id. at 244.
202. Classic landmarks in the theory of “virtue ethics” include G.E.M.
Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958), reprinted in VIRTUE
ETHICS 26 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997); Michael Stocker, The
Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories, 73 J. PHIL. 453 (1976), reprinted in
VIRTUE ETHICS, supra, at 66; ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (2002).
For an important effort to apply virtue ethics to a specific set of moral problems,
see Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223
(1991), reprinted in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra, at 217.
203. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 174 (1982); see also, e.g., Annette C. Baier, What Do
Women Want in a Moral Theory? 19 NOÛS 53 (1985).
204. See, e.g., DANIEL ENGSTER, THE HEART
POLITICAL THEORY 5-7 (2007).

OF

JUSTICE: CARE ETHICS

AND

205. See, e.g., EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON
EXTERIORITY 261-62 (Alphonso Lingis trans., Twentieth Printing 2007) (1961).
The Danish philosopher Knud Ejler Løgstrup similarly argued that the
fundamental ethical demand is to “take care of that in the other person’s life
which is dependent upon us and we have in our power.” KNUD EJLER LØGSTRUP,
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emphasis
on
agape—unconditional
love—in
the
understanding of human relations206 and even in law.207 These
accounts are different from each other and each is complex
and controversial. But they do share a basic emphasis on
contingency, contextuality, and lived experience,208 and it is
in that general neighborhood that I want to locate the
argument here from “analogy of dignity.”209
Fraternity. The Golden Rule. Virtue. Care. Encountering
the Other. Love. This is not bad company to keep for a moral
and political argument. As already suggested, my goal here
THE ETHICAL DEMAND 28 (Theodor I. Jensen trans., 1997). This demand is radical,
if also unfulfillable, not only in scope but also in content, for it excludes both any
reciprocal obligations and any judgments of the other person’s own decisions.
206. See ANDERS NYGREN, AGAPE AND EROS 41-45 (Philip S. Watson trans.,
1953). See generally GENE OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (1972);
Benedictus PP. XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate of the Supreme Pontiff
Benedict XVI to the Bishops Priests and Deacons Men and Women Religious the
Lay Faithful and all People of Good Will on Integral Human Development in
Charity and Truth, VATICAN.VA (June 29, 2009), http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_
caritas-in-veritate_en.html.
207. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Christian Love and Criminal Punishment, in
CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 219 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S.
Alexander eds., 2008); James Boyd White, Agape and the Activity of “Reframing,”
Address at 2014 Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion and
Ethics Conference on Love and Law (Feb. 8, 2014) (transcript available at
http://law.pepperdine.edu/nootbaar/annual-conference/loveandlaw/
presentations/AGAPE%20AND%20REFRAMING%20DRAFT.pdf).
208. It bears emphasis that the gravamen here is not merely psychological. I am
not suggesting that marriage should be extended to same-sex couples because
failing to do so would make the couples denied such an opportunity “feel bad.” If
anything, contemporary law focuses too much on feelings. See Perry Dane,
Professor of Law, Rutgers Sch. of Law, Endorsement, Legal Reason and the
Misguided Quest for Reasonableness: Address at the Third Bi-Annual Conference
of the International Consortium for Law and Religious Studies in Richmond,
Williamsburg, and Charlottesville, Virginia (Aug. 24, 2013) (transcript on file
with author). But ideas such as fraternity, the Golden Rule, and the like—with
all their situatedness and contingency—go much deeper than psychology and
feelings.
209. I am also influenced here by Martha Nussbaum’s observation that “public
emotions,” including the love of country and one’s fellow citizens, can help “diverse
people” overcome even deep-seated differences in political and moral ideals and
“embrace a common future.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY
LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 393 (2013).
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has not been to explicate any of these theories in any detail
but only to demonstrate, through these impressionistic
associations, the worth and moral rank of a non-reductionist
argument for same-sex marriage.
Arguments from equality and abstract right claim to
have a logical coercive power. I have no objection to such
arguments in those contexts in which they are appropriate.210
But—to come back to the claim with which I began this
Part—there is also a distinct power and, yes, dignity to
arguments whose compulsion is not detached and universal,
but interpersonal and situational. Such arguments—
particularly when other arguments fall short—require a real,
unblinking acknowledgment of both humanity and specific
human needs. Far from being condescending, they depend at
their core on mutuality and respect. With respect to same-sex
marriage specifically, the argument from analogy of dignity
has the added advantage of being normatively forthright.
Slogans such as “marriage equality” and “freedom to marry”
might be politically potent, but they risk pushing the actual
debate off center.211 The argument here, to the contrary,
explicitly and unapologetically focuses on same-sex couples
and their rightful place in a caring society.212
210. I therefore do not suggest going as far as, say, Richard Rorty, who wanted
to understand systems of political rights and obligations completely in the context
of empathy, solidarity, and communication. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
211. Cf. Mary Bernstein & Verta Taylor, Introduction: Marital Discord:
Understanding the Contested Place of Marriage in the Lesbian and Gay
Movement, in THE MARRYING KIND?: DEBATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WITHIN THE
LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT 1, 21-25 (Mary Bernstein & Verta Taylor eds., 2013)
(making similar observation about same-sex marriage advocacy organizations
such as “Equality California”); Amin Ghaziani, Post-Gay Collective Identity
Construction, 58 SOC. PROBLEMS 99, 111-19 (2011) (describing and critiquing a
“post-gay” sensibility and strategy in which LGBT student groups and civil rights
organizations come to adopt names such as “Pride Alliance” and “Equality [State
name]” that obscure specific references to the cause at issue).
212. Indeed, in this sense, the argument from analogy of dignity, in its
situational focus and bluntness, is actually considerably more responsive than
more conventional equality-based or rights-based claims to the worry among some
gay rights and queer analysts that the entire movement for same-sex marriage
could itself just be “another move toward decentering a lesbian and gay identity,
with the implication that it spells the beginning of the end of the LGBT
movement.” Bernstein & Taylor, supra note 211, at 21. Cf. Duggan, supra note
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At the same time, arguments from analogy of dignity
acknowledge the genuine difficulty of the question at hand
and the legitimacy of the other side. They do not require
labeling opponents as either stupid or bigoted. They allow,
even encourage, the conversation to proceed.
The texture of such arguments might also help explain
why the question of same-sex marriage might more properly
belong in the court of politics rather than the court of the
Constitution. As noted earlier, I remain agnostic on this
point.213 But whether or not there is a federal constitutional
right to same-sex marriage is in any event not relevant to the
significance or worthiness of the question or its resolution.
The Constitution is important. But is not the font or even the
home of all important values. It is just a mistake to imagine
that all important, even fundamental, normative arguments
must be constitutional arguments. To think that it must be
is to engage in a fallacy that I have elsewhere called
“constitutional glare.”214
B.
This last set of comments215 can also finally connect the
arguments in Part I about the “natural law” paradigm of
heterosexual marriage with the arguments in Part II about
the complex relationship between natural law and positive
law and in Part III about same-sex marriage as an expression
of analogy of dignity. Recall R.R. Reno’s argument that
extending marriage to same-sex couples “undermines the
proper separation of cultural and governmental power that is
so important for a liberal regime.”216 Let’s read this argument
in its strongest form, as identifying the “cultural” meaning of
marriage with its “natural law” meaning. Still, as I have tried
52, at 190 (critiquing “the new homonormativity” and its attendant “rhetorical
recoding,” in which, for example, “‘equality’ becomes narrow, formal access to a
few conservatizing institutions”).
213. See supra notes 179-186.
214. See, e.g., Dane, The Public, the Private, and the Sacred: Variations on a
Theme of Nomos and Narrative, supra note 128, at 21, 26.
215. See supra notes 193-214 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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to demonstrate, sufficiently sophisticated accounts of natural
law can leave room for positive law—the difference that
government makes—to transform the meaning of even the
most fundamental “natural” institutions.217 But that
transformation should not be merely willful. As I argued in
Part II, natural law (if it exists) and positive law are
interactive and mutually interstitial.
The argument from analogy of dignity suggests how
same-sex marriage can coexist with the heterosexual
paradigm of “natural law marriage.” But the analysis in this
Part has been stronger than that. By invoking values such as
fraternity, the golden rule, virtue, care, and love, it suggests
a dialectic within natural law itself between the institutional
forms appropriate to human continuity and the responses to
those institutions that might, at least in particular times and
places, be appropriate to human decency. Positive law then
steps in, not as a tyrannical agency of arbitrary state power,
but as the contemporary community’s contribution to that
dialectical conversation. In taking on the question of samesex marriage, we should tread carefully, even to some point
slowly. But tread we can, and should.
CONCLUSION
Observers have long noted that the campaign for samesex marriage is in a deep sense counter-radical, even counterrevolutionary.218 My argument here, in its view of marriage,
is even more so (though in other respects it is radical
indeed).219 The institution of marriage is not above criticism
or immune to deconstruction. But such criticism and
deconstruction is not necessary to extending the possibility of
marriage to same-sex couples. Same-sex marriage does not
require upending the traditional paradigm of what marriage
is or what it is for. Appreciating that simple point is
217. See supra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
218. The classic “conservative” case for same-sex marriage was made in
SULLIVAN, supra note 178, at 94-132; see also RAUCH, supra note 69, at 4-5,79, 9293; Dale Carpenter, A Traditionalist Case for Gay Marriage, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 93,
96-103 (2008).
219. See supra note 211; see also notes 180-86 & 194-214 and accompanying
text.
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intellectually and morally important. It might also help
bridge the bitter divide that threatens to remain and fester
whatever the outcome of the current legal and political
struggle.

